Russia's Managed Democracy
Past experiments with liberal democracy have led Russia to the brink of civil war, economic collapse and the plunder of state resources. Daniel Beer explains why most Russians feel happier with a strongman firmly in control.
www.historytoday.com/daniel-beer/russias-managed-democracy______________________________________________________________________
'Sovereign democracy', Russian-style
Vladimir Putin's Russia is not a trivial authoritarian state. It is not "Soviet Union lite". It is not a liberal democracy either. It is, however, a "managed democracy". The term captures the logic and the mechanisms of the reproduction of power and the way democratic institutions are used and misused to preserve the monopoly of power.
But the concept of managed democracy is also insufficient. It cannot illuminate Vladimir Putin's Russia considered not as a power machine but as a political ambition. It cannot explain why Putin resists becoming president-for-life; why, unlike his central Asian colleagues, he has declared his intention to step down at the end of his second constitutional term in 2008. It cannot explain what distinguish Putin's concept of sovereign democracy and Hugo Chàvez's concept of sovereign democracy.
www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/sovereign_democracy_4104.jsp________________________________________________________________________________
What Happened to Russian Democracy?
When then-President Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank in 1991, waving a fist in defiance of communist hard-liners, he heralded a new dawn for Russia.
The Soviet Union collapsed months later, promising to usher in a new era of Western-style democracy. But at the end of Yeltsin's rule, eight years later, democracy had become a dirty word for most Russians.
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7762959______________________________________________________________________________
Would democratic change in Russia transform its foreign policy?
The incompatibility of an anachronistic and arbitrary regime with the modern world is leading many to consider that democratic change is possible — likely even — in Russia. But those expecting that a new ‘democratic’ government would somehow take a softer line on foreign policy should think again, says Ivan Krastev.
If Russia undergoes democratic change, what would its foreign policy look like? Would it be greatly different from what it is now? Would it be much more in tune with American foreign policy? Would it share European values? Or would there still remain important differences between Russia and the West?
These questions, all posed recently by American analyst Mark Katz, are important ones, particularly so given that relations between Putin’s Russia and the West seem to have reached a dead end. Obama’s ‘reset’ with Moscow is over, and in the near future we can expect only banality, frustration, noise and growing mutual mistrust. Viewed from Washington, Russia has become both more annoying and less needed. The shale gas revolution has made Americans uninterested in Russia’s energy resources. The UN has proven ineffective in dealing with global crisis, so Russia’s seat on the Security Council is of diminishing value. American troops are on their way out of Afghanistan, so there is less need for Moscow’s assistance there either. Washington has outsourced the task of changing Moscow’s position on Syria to the Turks. And the American Senate has lost patience with Kremlin’s symbolic politics, most recently over legislation banning American citizens from adopting Russian children. (Americans were of course expecting retaliation for the Magnitsky Act, but they were shocked by the cruelness of the response. Does the Kremlin really believe that it punishes America by punishing its own orphans?)
www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ivan-krastev/would-democratic-change-in-russia-transform-its-foreign-policy____________________________________________________________________________