Post by peterd on Jun 30, 2013 15:35:45 GMT -8
Emerging Flashpoints in Africa and the Middle East by Andrew McGregor
As we enter the summer of 2013, some flashpoints that dominated the news earlier this year appear to be calming, while new security crises are beginning to emerge in other parts of the world. In Mali, where a French-led military intervention succeeded in driving Islamist militants from the northern part of the country earlier this year, a preliminary agreement reached this month with remaining Tuareg separatist rebels would seem to pave the way for the return of Malian troops to the Kidal region and a general election scheduled for July (MNLA troops in the Kidal region, pictured right). These steps, however, will not bring an end to AQIM-supported terrorism in the Sahel/Sahara region, as seen in recent attacks on the military and energy infrastructure in neighboring Niger. Possibly operating from bases in southern Libya, militant leaders like Mokhtar Belmokhtar can be expected to continue kidnappings and attacks on French and other Western interests in the region.
Elsewhere in Africa, the decision to begin construction of a series of enormous dams on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia threatens to become a new source of conflict in north-eastern Africa. Egypt, in particular, has vowed to prevent Ethiopia from interfering with the flow of Nile water that fuels Egypt’s own energy and agricultural projects. Sudan is also building its own series of dams on the Nile in Nubia. As fresh water becomes an increasingly important commodity in the 21st century, there is a danger that new conflicts over water availability may become a source of political conflict. Talks are underway to resolve the differences, but should they fail, a new crisis may emerge over the allocation of Nile waters.
Egypt is becoming disturbingly polarized, both on a sectarian level (Islamists vs. Coptic Christians, Muslim Brothers vs. Salafists) and on a political level (Islamists vs. Secularists). Major anti-government demonstrations scheduled for the end of the month have the potential to turn violent. The beleaguered Interior Ministry has said it will not intervene in the protests, leading the Army to issue a stern warning it is prepared to intervene to restore order if necessary. President Mursi is under enormous pressure outside his own party to schedule early elections, but will ultimately have to rely on the security structure to complete his term.
The U.S. decision to provide arms to Syrian insurgents seems destined to be the first step in a greater U.S. and Western commitment to regime change in Syria. Unfortunately, no clear alternative to the Assad regime has emerged and the opposition coalition contains forces opposed to Western interests, most notably the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. With the opposition suffering important reversals on the battlefield in recent weeks, there will be great pressure within the opposition to see that the new arms flow to the opposition’s most capable fighters – the armed Sunni Islamist groups. Whether desired or not, it may become necessary to insert Special Forces operatives to improve the military capabilities of the secular opposition groups and to oversee the distribution of weapons, a possible first step in the escalation of U.S./Western involvement in the Syrian rebellion.
As we enter the summer of 2013, some flashpoints that dominated the news earlier this year appear to be calming, while new security crises are beginning to emerge in other parts of the world. In Mali, where a French-led military intervention succeeded in driving Islamist militants from the northern part of the country earlier this year, a preliminary agreement reached this month with remaining Tuareg separatist rebels would seem to pave the way for the return of Malian troops to the Kidal region and a general election scheduled for July (MNLA troops in the Kidal region, pictured right). These steps, however, will not bring an end to AQIM-supported terrorism in the Sahel/Sahara region, as seen in recent attacks on the military and energy infrastructure in neighboring Niger. Possibly operating from bases in southern Libya, militant leaders like Mokhtar Belmokhtar can be expected to continue kidnappings and attacks on French and other Western interests in the region.
Elsewhere in Africa, the decision to begin construction of a series of enormous dams on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia threatens to become a new source of conflict in north-eastern Africa. Egypt, in particular, has vowed to prevent Ethiopia from interfering with the flow of Nile water that fuels Egypt’s own energy and agricultural projects. Sudan is also building its own series of dams on the Nile in Nubia. As fresh water becomes an increasingly important commodity in the 21st century, there is a danger that new conflicts over water availability may become a source of political conflict. Talks are underway to resolve the differences, but should they fail, a new crisis may emerge over the allocation of Nile waters.
Egypt is becoming disturbingly polarized, both on a sectarian level (Islamists vs. Coptic Christians, Muslim Brothers vs. Salafists) and on a political level (Islamists vs. Secularists). Major anti-government demonstrations scheduled for the end of the month have the potential to turn violent. The beleaguered Interior Ministry has said it will not intervene in the protests, leading the Army to issue a stern warning it is prepared to intervene to restore order if necessary. President Mursi is under enormous pressure outside his own party to schedule early elections, but will ultimately have to rely on the security structure to complete his term.
The U.S. decision to provide arms to Syrian insurgents seems destined to be the first step in a greater U.S. and Western commitment to regime change in Syria. Unfortunately, no clear alternative to the Assad regime has emerged and the opposition coalition contains forces opposed to Western interests, most notably the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. With the opposition suffering important reversals on the battlefield in recent weeks, there will be great pressure within the opposition to see that the new arms flow to the opposition’s most capable fighters – the armed Sunni Islamist groups. Whether desired or not, it may become necessary to insert Special Forces operatives to improve the military capabilities of the secular opposition groups and to oversee the distribution of weapons, a possible first step in the escalation of U.S./Western involvement in the Syrian rebellion.