Post by peterd on Sept 10, 2013 14:42:51 GMT -8
Russia’s Syrian Military Woes: Defense Exports and High Technology Opponents
Moscow’s apparently principled opposition to any possible United States military intervention in Syria, in the aftermath of the chemical weapons use in the suburbs of Damascus on August 21, not only deflected the process away from the United Nations, but served as another indicator that US-Russia relations have entered a prolonged “post-reset” period. Moscow’s stance, including its last-minute offer on September 9 to Damascus to place its chemical weapons under international control, prejudges the vote on military action in the US Congress and enables the Kremlin to label any US operation in Syria as “illegal.” However, the claims by the Kremlin following the G20 summit in St. Petersburg that in case of US intervention Russia would respond with further arms supplies to Damascus to support the Bashar al-Assad regime appear hollow. Indeed, closer analysis of Russian arms supplies to Syria to date and possible future supplies to the country focus on Moscow’s real area of sensitivity: namely, air defense exports and the potential for Russian systems to be overwhelmed in an encounter with a technologically superior adversary (Interfax, September 9).
On September 5, Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressed that Russian military supplies to Syria did not breach international law, in keeping with the effort Moscow has made since the start of the crisis to claim the moral high ground in terms of global law and order. Indeed, on the previous day, President Vladimir Putin stated that although Russia has supplied Syria with the advanced S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, the delivery had not yet been completed. It appears that Moscow has only supplied components of the S-300 to date (Interfax, September 5; Channel One TV, September 4).
Nonetheless, some Russian sources also claim that Syria’s air defenses could withstand a potential US air attack. Interfax cited “an informed military source,” alleging that “Syria’s air-defense system is very effective, because it has been built in the image and likeliness of the air-defense system that existed in the Soviet Union. It is multi-layered, built with the maximum use of fighter aviation and all weapons of both facility-based and tactical air defenses.” The source, referred to as “a former head of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Air Defense System,” added that Syrian air defense is structured in such a way that enemy aircraft entering its airspace simply cannot leave it. The source added that Buk SAM systems would be used against cruise missiles: “Here the effectiveness of the air-defense forces could be somewhat reduced, because Tomahawks will travel around terrain features at low altitudes. The expected forecast of hitting cruise missiles is a probability of about 0.5 [50 percent],” before explaining that air defense is much stronger around the Syrian capital (Interfax, September 5).
It is important to note, however, that the “informed military source” made no mention of the S-300, supporting Putin’s comments that the full system has not been supplied to Damascus. The head of the Russian presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, said that in recent years Moscow supplied “a considerable number of air-defense systems to Syria and that there is no point in supplying them now.” Ivanov, a former defense minister, explained, “I shall not make a secret out of this, over the past 10–15 years, Russia supplied a considerable number of air-defense systems to Syria; it is absolutely meaningless to supply them on the last day.” Ivanov’s remarks contradicted Putin’s claims that Moscow might be able to help the Assad regime in some concrete manner, referring to Moscow taking such action if the US launches strikes against Syria. Ivanov was in no doubt that such efforts would prove futile. “At the moment any supplies are pointless, I already talked about this,” he added (RIA Novosti, September 5).
The real sensitivity in Moscow concerning Syrian air defense is rooted in the fact that the latter’s assets are Soviet/Russian supplied, though the attempts to put distance between this fact and the presence or not of the advanced S-300s are equally tied to protecting the reputation of that SAM system. In Rosoboroneksport’s portfolio, international orders for air defense systems are 40 percent greater than for aviation. This shift in the ratio of air defense systems and aviation is linked to international instability stemming from the Arab Spring. Rosoboroneksport Deputy Director General Aleksandr Mikheyev confirmed this change in an interview with the journal Eksport Vooruzheniye in August 2013. Mikheyev stated that delivery of air defense equipment amounts to $8.4 billion in revenue, while aircraft and helicopters account for $6 billion. These figures appear to relate to fulfilling existing orders. The new primacy of air defense assets in arms exports occurred in 2012. However, a defense industry source told Vedomosti that “in this there is no single operating export contract for a more powerful and expensive Russian PVO [air defense] system than the S-300 PMU2, not considering the, in fact, frozen contract with Syria for four such systems at a cost of around $1 billion. There is only one contract on the other expensive long-range system, the S-300VM, for the delivery of two battalions [units] to Venezuela at a cost of less than $1 billion, and this agreement has basically been fulfilled” (Vedomosti, August 29).
One manager in a company manufacturing Russian air defense equipment suggested that the experience of recent Western interventions demonstrates a strong air defense system will slow the progress of such air operations. The same unidentified source went on to highlight that although Syria has strong air defenses, two years of civil war had taken their toll, with desertions and the withdrawal of troops from other branches of service. The Vedomosti article ended by downplaying the potential “lessons” to be drawn from a US strike on Syria, since this would be accomplished using ship-launched cruise missiles and “other weaponry” and delivery platforms to avoid approaching the air defense zone (Vedomosti, August 29).
Military sensitivities in Moscow lie in the possibility that US suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) as part of a strike on Syria will again reveal the vulnerability of Russian supplied, trained and modeled air defense against a high technology opponent. Meanwhile, such successful SEAD and air operations to follow will undoubtedly leave Russian military exports vulnerable. Consequently, Moscow has launched its own first strike in the possible US strike on Syria—to commercially protect the reputation of the S-300 export versions.
--Roger McDermott
_____________________________________________________
Cossacks Now Patrol Half of Stavropol Krai: Police Adjuncts or Something More?
Cossack units are now patrolling the streets in 12 of the 26 districts of Stavropol krai as well as in Moscow and other Russian regions. Their presence suggests they are simultaneously, as they claim, adjuncts to the local police—street forces the authorities can deploy in extra-legal ways with deniability for themselves—and a cradle of possibly more serious challenges to regional leaders and to Moscow itself.
The first role of the Cossacks, that of adjuncts to the police, is especially prominent in Stavropol, a majority ethnic Russian region in the North Caucasus. There, Terek Cossack Ataman Aleksandr Fal’ko last week told Stavropol Governor Valery Zerenkov that 162 Cossacks are working full time, and 80 more part time, on patrolling the streets of 12 of the krai’s districts. In making his report, Fal’ko said that the Cossacks need government financing if this is to continue because they are performing a public security role (nazaccent.ru/content/8984-kazaki-rasskazali-gubernatoru-stavropolya-kak-patruliruyut.html). While some officials appear willing to help, others oppose doing so, apparently because they fear creating a force structure they will not be able to completely control (nazaccent.ru/content/8558-vlastyam-stavropolya-ne-nravyatsya-pretenzii-kazakov.html).
That the Cossacks could get out of hand or that they could be disowned as such even if they do what the authorities want calls attention to the second possible role that Cossacks in Russia may play. Last week, in neighboring Krasnodar krai, Cossack units forced Chinese and other migrant workers to leave by blocking their access to water that the guest workers were supposedly using illegally (bigcaucasus.com/events/actual/04-09-2013/86076-china-0/).
The actions of the Cossacks in this case crossed the line as far as Russian law is concerned, but the steps they took were apparently very popular among the local population. Such illegalities by Cossacks are a reminder that these units may take action at the behest of the authorities who do not want to take such steps on their own or—even more dangerously—take actions that reflect their own interests or those of other groups in the population against the authorities (bigcaucasus.com/events/actual/04-09-2013/86076-china-0/).
As a result of such developments, there is a danger and even the possibility that the Cossacks will demand more deference and financial support from the Russian authorities, writes Anton Bredikhin, a political scientist at the Russian State Humanitarian University (gumilev-center.ru/kazachijj-separatizm-sovremennoe-sostoyanie/). He further warns that these consequences may lead to the establishment of separate Cossack districts in areas where they have long lived, but which are defined as belonging either to Russians or non-Russian groups, or even the formation of an independent Cossack state on the basis of secession from Russia or Ukraine.
The scholar says that his goal is to “consider contemporary separatist and autonomous tendencies on the territory of Russia in regions that have an autochthonous [indigenous] Cossack population and also to analyze their prospects” and to assess how realistic they are. After a brief discussion of Cossack autonomist ideas during the Russian Civil War, Bredikhin notes that in the fall of 1991, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, there were proclaimed several Cossack “state formations”: the Don Cossack Republic, the Terek Cossack Republic, the Armavir Cossack Republic, the Upper Kuban Republic, the Zelenchuk-Urupsk Cossack Soviet Socialist Republic and the Batalpashin Cossack Republic. These came together to form a Union of Cossack Republics of the South of Russia.
In December 1991, Cossack groups, together with a part of the Krasnodar Soviet Army garrison even tried to take power. They failed, and these various secessionist “republics” were suppressed by “local regional elites, not by the weakening federal center.” But if the republics are gone and if Russian realities have changed, Cossack interest in autonomy, either genuine or as a tactic to extract resources from the Russian authorities, has continued, Bredikhin says.
Some Cossacks, he notes, still talk about self-determination and secession, with a few even saying that they plan to appeal to the United Nations. But most Cossacks, the scholar continues, support the Russian state and its efforts to establish and maintain order. That does not mean their agendas are not a problem, however. Cossacks overwhelmingly support “the maximum integration of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan,” he says—a Russian policy, but one that at least some Cossacks see as a step toward achieving their own desire for more funding and more autonomy.
A possible reason for concern, Bredikhin admits, is that the younger generation of Cossacks is very different from its predecessors. Unlike them, it is ambitious, media saavy, and is “attempting to reanimate separatist ideas and, by using them, receive necessary preferences.” He does not discuss how these young Cossacks might behave if they make demands but are rejected. But “in the current political situation,” such demands are “not only impossible but unrealizable in the near term.” Just how long “the near term” will last, however, is not a question the researcher addresses.
--Paul Goble
_______________________________________________________
Economic Slowdown Reveals Structural Problems in Zhanaozen-style Towns
One and a half years after the tragic events in western Kazakhstan’s Zhanaozen, where 16 striking oil workers died and over 110 were wounded in bloody clashes with riot police, the Kazakhstani government is once again reassessing the situation in this troubled town. On August 21, following his recent trip to Mangistau province, Nurlan Erimbetov, the acting director of the Center for Social Partnership under Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign welfare fund, noted that Zhanaozen is still exposed to the risk of social unrest against the backdrop of poor economic prospects and worsening demographics. Erimbetov also confessed that the absence of a coordinated migration policy only aggravated the local state of affairs, leading to the possibility of more tensions in the near future (Total.kz, August, 21).
While Zhanaozen shares many common traits with other single-industry urban centers scattered around present-day Kazakhstan, its demographic situation represents a truly unique case. As the National Statistics Agency reported this February, Zhanaozen’s population grew by a whopping 78 percent between 2003 and 2013, increasing from 57,000 inhabitants ten years ago to almost 102,000 as of today. A similar dynamic was demonstrated only by two other towns—Turkestan in the South Kazakhstan province and Kaskelen in the neighboring Almaty province. However, the Mangistau region recently set an absolute record in terms of demographic growth, since its total population increased by 1.7 percent in January–June 2013, ahead of any other Kazakhstani region, including the most populous southern provinces. Overall, Kazakhstan’s population grew by 0.7 percent during this six-month period. As to the causes of Zhanaozen’s unrivaled demographic growth, it has been stimulated by both the massive arrival of workers from neighboring towns and the active repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs from Turkmenistan under a government-sponsored initiative (Trend.az, August, 14; News.nur.kz, February, 20).
As Nurlan Erimbetov believes, many of Zhanaozen’s current residents still expect to find jobs in the town or in its immediate vicinity, despite the fact that the employment opportunities at local energy companies are continuously in decline due to the year-by-year depletion of nearby oil and gas fields. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s energy sector has recently been experiencing difficulties caused by flagging demand for raw materials as well as technological and logistics problems, including delays provoked by the ongoing modernization of the country’s three oil refineries. In January 2013, the National Statistics Agency reported that oil production in Kazakhstan had decreased by 1.1 percent in January–December 2012, as compared to the previous year. In order to tackle unemployment and reduce socioeconomic risks in and outside of Zhanaozen, Samruk-Kazyna has been implementing a number of training programs aimed at ensuring the successful requalification of jobless workers for the needs of non-extracting industries. The Ministry of Regional Development established in September 2012 by President Nazarbayev’s decree is also deeply involved in the elaboration of such assistance measures (Total.kz, August 21; Oilnews.kz, January 14).
Other single-industry towns have also become victims of Kazakhstan’s slowed growth, which are directly correlated with the poor performance of the export-oriented extractive sectors of its economy. On June 20, the management of Kazakhmys Plc, one of the country’s largest industrial companies, announced the forthcoming closure of a smelting plant in Zhezkazgan (Karaganda province). Four days later, over a hundred workers protested this decision, questioning their bosses’ readiness to offer new employment and accommodation opportunities to ordinary employees and their families. On July 3, Regional Development Minister Bakytzhan Sagintayev met the workers and solemnly promised that none of them would be dismissed. The following day, Kazakhmys and its trade union signed a formal memorandum laying down the employer’s obligations extending over the two plus years during which the plant is expected to undergo a profound renovation. Though this intervention avoided a new labor conflict, it appears Kazakhmys will still be hard pressed to honor all of its promises in the context of rapidly falling profits and a vague business outlook. The company reported $962 million worth of net losses in the first semester of 2013, against net profits amounting to $122 million in January–June 2012 (Kazinform, August 22; Fergananews.com, July 4).
Temirtau offers another example of a town heavily dependent on a sole industry and employer. On August 23, around 50 workers of ArcelorMittal’s local factory protested the non-payment of compensations for injuries sustained at the workplace. The steel giant’s contracted insurance company had earlier refused to pay such indemnities due to suspicions of the employer’s reported injury statistics, and the labor dispute rapidly grew into an open conflict. Presently, ArcelorMittal-Temirtau is confronted with the precipitous fall of demand for its steel production, as markets continue to stagnate and bring prices further down. In January–September 2012, the company’s profits decreased over 12 times as compared to the same period of 2011. A similarly difficult situation is observed at the Eurasian National Resources Corporation, which employs some 65,000 people in Kazakhstan alone (KazTag, August, 23; Newskaz.ru, March 20; Newskaz.ru, October 31, 2012).
Following the Zhanaozen tragedy, the Kazakhstani government has intensified its support to single-industry towns and areas impacted by the slowdown of the country’s industrial growth. It has also become more attentive to nascent labor conflicts, quickly mobilizing local authorities to engage in direct dialogue with both workers and employers. One such recent case is the July 2013 strike by over 200 employees of CAPE Industrial Services, a service company deployed at the Kashagan oil and gas deposit on the Caspian Sea (see EDM, July 23). However, two major factors inhibit these latest efforts. First, the economic crisis is pushing large industrial entities to cut down costs and close unprofitable facilities. In this context, the Kazakhstani government is likely to speed up its diversification plans to create new jobs in innovative fields, even if such reforms are most often highly time-consuming. Second, the central government’s efforts may be challenged by both regional and local controlling interest groups. Therefore, a refurbished command and control structure may be needed to ensure the timely implementation of state policies and prevent the embezzlement of public funds.
Despite the gloomy outlook, Kazakhstan’s GDP is expected to grow by slightly over 5 percent in 2013, more than in most other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries as well as in Europe. The launch of oil production at Kashagan will likely also have a medium- to long-term positive impact on the country’s economic prospects as well as its oil and gas industry. The Kazakhstani government’s efforts to stabilize the socioeconomic situation in places like Zhanaozen will thus receive a sizeable impetus, should these trends be confirmed (IMF, August 14).
--Georgiy Voloshin
Moscow’s apparently principled opposition to any possible United States military intervention in Syria, in the aftermath of the chemical weapons use in the suburbs of Damascus on August 21, not only deflected the process away from the United Nations, but served as another indicator that US-Russia relations have entered a prolonged “post-reset” period. Moscow’s stance, including its last-minute offer on September 9 to Damascus to place its chemical weapons under international control, prejudges the vote on military action in the US Congress and enables the Kremlin to label any US operation in Syria as “illegal.” However, the claims by the Kremlin following the G20 summit in St. Petersburg that in case of US intervention Russia would respond with further arms supplies to Damascus to support the Bashar al-Assad regime appear hollow. Indeed, closer analysis of Russian arms supplies to Syria to date and possible future supplies to the country focus on Moscow’s real area of sensitivity: namely, air defense exports and the potential for Russian systems to be overwhelmed in an encounter with a technologically superior adversary (Interfax, September 9).
On September 5, Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stressed that Russian military supplies to Syria did not breach international law, in keeping with the effort Moscow has made since the start of the crisis to claim the moral high ground in terms of global law and order. Indeed, on the previous day, President Vladimir Putin stated that although Russia has supplied Syria with the advanced S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, the delivery had not yet been completed. It appears that Moscow has only supplied components of the S-300 to date (Interfax, September 5; Channel One TV, September 4).
Nonetheless, some Russian sources also claim that Syria’s air defenses could withstand a potential US air attack. Interfax cited “an informed military source,” alleging that “Syria’s air-defense system is very effective, because it has been built in the image and likeliness of the air-defense system that existed in the Soviet Union. It is multi-layered, built with the maximum use of fighter aviation and all weapons of both facility-based and tactical air defenses.” The source, referred to as “a former head of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Air Defense System,” added that Syrian air defense is structured in such a way that enemy aircraft entering its airspace simply cannot leave it. The source added that Buk SAM systems would be used against cruise missiles: “Here the effectiveness of the air-defense forces could be somewhat reduced, because Tomahawks will travel around terrain features at low altitudes. The expected forecast of hitting cruise missiles is a probability of about 0.5 [50 percent],” before explaining that air defense is much stronger around the Syrian capital (Interfax, September 5).
It is important to note, however, that the “informed military source” made no mention of the S-300, supporting Putin’s comments that the full system has not been supplied to Damascus. The head of the Russian presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, said that in recent years Moscow supplied “a considerable number of air-defense systems to Syria and that there is no point in supplying them now.” Ivanov, a former defense minister, explained, “I shall not make a secret out of this, over the past 10–15 years, Russia supplied a considerable number of air-defense systems to Syria; it is absolutely meaningless to supply them on the last day.” Ivanov’s remarks contradicted Putin’s claims that Moscow might be able to help the Assad regime in some concrete manner, referring to Moscow taking such action if the US launches strikes against Syria. Ivanov was in no doubt that such efforts would prove futile. “At the moment any supplies are pointless, I already talked about this,” he added (RIA Novosti, September 5).
The real sensitivity in Moscow concerning Syrian air defense is rooted in the fact that the latter’s assets are Soviet/Russian supplied, though the attempts to put distance between this fact and the presence or not of the advanced S-300s are equally tied to protecting the reputation of that SAM system. In Rosoboroneksport’s portfolio, international orders for air defense systems are 40 percent greater than for aviation. This shift in the ratio of air defense systems and aviation is linked to international instability stemming from the Arab Spring. Rosoboroneksport Deputy Director General Aleksandr Mikheyev confirmed this change in an interview with the journal Eksport Vooruzheniye in August 2013. Mikheyev stated that delivery of air defense equipment amounts to $8.4 billion in revenue, while aircraft and helicopters account for $6 billion. These figures appear to relate to fulfilling existing orders. The new primacy of air defense assets in arms exports occurred in 2012. However, a defense industry source told Vedomosti that “in this there is no single operating export contract for a more powerful and expensive Russian PVO [air defense] system than the S-300 PMU2, not considering the, in fact, frozen contract with Syria for four such systems at a cost of around $1 billion. There is only one contract on the other expensive long-range system, the S-300VM, for the delivery of two battalions [units] to Venezuela at a cost of less than $1 billion, and this agreement has basically been fulfilled” (Vedomosti, August 29).
One manager in a company manufacturing Russian air defense equipment suggested that the experience of recent Western interventions demonstrates a strong air defense system will slow the progress of such air operations. The same unidentified source went on to highlight that although Syria has strong air defenses, two years of civil war had taken their toll, with desertions and the withdrawal of troops from other branches of service. The Vedomosti article ended by downplaying the potential “lessons” to be drawn from a US strike on Syria, since this would be accomplished using ship-launched cruise missiles and “other weaponry” and delivery platforms to avoid approaching the air defense zone (Vedomosti, August 29).
Military sensitivities in Moscow lie in the possibility that US suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) as part of a strike on Syria will again reveal the vulnerability of Russian supplied, trained and modeled air defense against a high technology opponent. Meanwhile, such successful SEAD and air operations to follow will undoubtedly leave Russian military exports vulnerable. Consequently, Moscow has launched its own first strike in the possible US strike on Syria—to commercially protect the reputation of the S-300 export versions.
--Roger McDermott
_____________________________________________________
Cossacks Now Patrol Half of Stavropol Krai: Police Adjuncts or Something More?
Cossack units are now patrolling the streets in 12 of the 26 districts of Stavropol krai as well as in Moscow and other Russian regions. Their presence suggests they are simultaneously, as they claim, adjuncts to the local police—street forces the authorities can deploy in extra-legal ways with deniability for themselves—and a cradle of possibly more serious challenges to regional leaders and to Moscow itself.
The first role of the Cossacks, that of adjuncts to the police, is especially prominent in Stavropol, a majority ethnic Russian region in the North Caucasus. There, Terek Cossack Ataman Aleksandr Fal’ko last week told Stavropol Governor Valery Zerenkov that 162 Cossacks are working full time, and 80 more part time, on patrolling the streets of 12 of the krai’s districts. In making his report, Fal’ko said that the Cossacks need government financing if this is to continue because they are performing a public security role (nazaccent.ru/content/8984-kazaki-rasskazali-gubernatoru-stavropolya-kak-patruliruyut.html). While some officials appear willing to help, others oppose doing so, apparently because they fear creating a force structure they will not be able to completely control (nazaccent.ru/content/8558-vlastyam-stavropolya-ne-nravyatsya-pretenzii-kazakov.html).
That the Cossacks could get out of hand or that they could be disowned as such even if they do what the authorities want calls attention to the second possible role that Cossacks in Russia may play. Last week, in neighboring Krasnodar krai, Cossack units forced Chinese and other migrant workers to leave by blocking their access to water that the guest workers were supposedly using illegally (bigcaucasus.com/events/actual/04-09-2013/86076-china-0/).
The actions of the Cossacks in this case crossed the line as far as Russian law is concerned, but the steps they took were apparently very popular among the local population. Such illegalities by Cossacks are a reminder that these units may take action at the behest of the authorities who do not want to take such steps on their own or—even more dangerously—take actions that reflect their own interests or those of other groups in the population against the authorities (bigcaucasus.com/events/actual/04-09-2013/86076-china-0/).
As a result of such developments, there is a danger and even the possibility that the Cossacks will demand more deference and financial support from the Russian authorities, writes Anton Bredikhin, a political scientist at the Russian State Humanitarian University (gumilev-center.ru/kazachijj-separatizm-sovremennoe-sostoyanie/). He further warns that these consequences may lead to the establishment of separate Cossack districts in areas where they have long lived, but which are defined as belonging either to Russians or non-Russian groups, or even the formation of an independent Cossack state on the basis of secession from Russia or Ukraine.
The scholar says that his goal is to “consider contemporary separatist and autonomous tendencies on the territory of Russia in regions that have an autochthonous [indigenous] Cossack population and also to analyze their prospects” and to assess how realistic they are. After a brief discussion of Cossack autonomist ideas during the Russian Civil War, Bredikhin notes that in the fall of 1991, as the Soviet Union was disintegrating, there were proclaimed several Cossack “state formations”: the Don Cossack Republic, the Terek Cossack Republic, the Armavir Cossack Republic, the Upper Kuban Republic, the Zelenchuk-Urupsk Cossack Soviet Socialist Republic and the Batalpashin Cossack Republic. These came together to form a Union of Cossack Republics of the South of Russia.
In December 1991, Cossack groups, together with a part of the Krasnodar Soviet Army garrison even tried to take power. They failed, and these various secessionist “republics” were suppressed by “local regional elites, not by the weakening federal center.” But if the republics are gone and if Russian realities have changed, Cossack interest in autonomy, either genuine or as a tactic to extract resources from the Russian authorities, has continued, Bredikhin says.
Some Cossacks, he notes, still talk about self-determination and secession, with a few even saying that they plan to appeal to the United Nations. But most Cossacks, the scholar continues, support the Russian state and its efforts to establish and maintain order. That does not mean their agendas are not a problem, however. Cossacks overwhelmingly support “the maximum integration of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan,” he says—a Russian policy, but one that at least some Cossacks see as a step toward achieving their own desire for more funding and more autonomy.
A possible reason for concern, Bredikhin admits, is that the younger generation of Cossacks is very different from its predecessors. Unlike them, it is ambitious, media saavy, and is “attempting to reanimate separatist ideas and, by using them, receive necessary preferences.” He does not discuss how these young Cossacks might behave if they make demands but are rejected. But “in the current political situation,” such demands are “not only impossible but unrealizable in the near term.” Just how long “the near term” will last, however, is not a question the researcher addresses.
--Paul Goble
_______________________________________________________
Economic Slowdown Reveals Structural Problems in Zhanaozen-style Towns
One and a half years after the tragic events in western Kazakhstan’s Zhanaozen, where 16 striking oil workers died and over 110 were wounded in bloody clashes with riot police, the Kazakhstani government is once again reassessing the situation in this troubled town. On August 21, following his recent trip to Mangistau province, Nurlan Erimbetov, the acting director of the Center for Social Partnership under Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign welfare fund, noted that Zhanaozen is still exposed to the risk of social unrest against the backdrop of poor economic prospects and worsening demographics. Erimbetov also confessed that the absence of a coordinated migration policy only aggravated the local state of affairs, leading to the possibility of more tensions in the near future (Total.kz, August, 21).
While Zhanaozen shares many common traits with other single-industry urban centers scattered around present-day Kazakhstan, its demographic situation represents a truly unique case. As the National Statistics Agency reported this February, Zhanaozen’s population grew by a whopping 78 percent between 2003 and 2013, increasing from 57,000 inhabitants ten years ago to almost 102,000 as of today. A similar dynamic was demonstrated only by two other towns—Turkestan in the South Kazakhstan province and Kaskelen in the neighboring Almaty province. However, the Mangistau region recently set an absolute record in terms of demographic growth, since its total population increased by 1.7 percent in January–June 2013, ahead of any other Kazakhstani region, including the most populous southern provinces. Overall, Kazakhstan’s population grew by 0.7 percent during this six-month period. As to the causes of Zhanaozen’s unrivaled demographic growth, it has been stimulated by both the massive arrival of workers from neighboring towns and the active repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs from Turkmenistan under a government-sponsored initiative (Trend.az, August, 14; News.nur.kz, February, 20).
As Nurlan Erimbetov believes, many of Zhanaozen’s current residents still expect to find jobs in the town or in its immediate vicinity, despite the fact that the employment opportunities at local energy companies are continuously in decline due to the year-by-year depletion of nearby oil and gas fields. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s energy sector has recently been experiencing difficulties caused by flagging demand for raw materials as well as technological and logistics problems, including delays provoked by the ongoing modernization of the country’s three oil refineries. In January 2013, the National Statistics Agency reported that oil production in Kazakhstan had decreased by 1.1 percent in January–December 2012, as compared to the previous year. In order to tackle unemployment and reduce socioeconomic risks in and outside of Zhanaozen, Samruk-Kazyna has been implementing a number of training programs aimed at ensuring the successful requalification of jobless workers for the needs of non-extracting industries. The Ministry of Regional Development established in September 2012 by President Nazarbayev’s decree is also deeply involved in the elaboration of such assistance measures (Total.kz, August 21; Oilnews.kz, January 14).
Other single-industry towns have also become victims of Kazakhstan’s slowed growth, which are directly correlated with the poor performance of the export-oriented extractive sectors of its economy. On June 20, the management of Kazakhmys Plc, one of the country’s largest industrial companies, announced the forthcoming closure of a smelting plant in Zhezkazgan (Karaganda province). Four days later, over a hundred workers protested this decision, questioning their bosses’ readiness to offer new employment and accommodation opportunities to ordinary employees and their families. On July 3, Regional Development Minister Bakytzhan Sagintayev met the workers and solemnly promised that none of them would be dismissed. The following day, Kazakhmys and its trade union signed a formal memorandum laying down the employer’s obligations extending over the two plus years during which the plant is expected to undergo a profound renovation. Though this intervention avoided a new labor conflict, it appears Kazakhmys will still be hard pressed to honor all of its promises in the context of rapidly falling profits and a vague business outlook. The company reported $962 million worth of net losses in the first semester of 2013, against net profits amounting to $122 million in January–June 2012 (Kazinform, August 22; Fergananews.com, July 4).
Temirtau offers another example of a town heavily dependent on a sole industry and employer. On August 23, around 50 workers of ArcelorMittal’s local factory protested the non-payment of compensations for injuries sustained at the workplace. The steel giant’s contracted insurance company had earlier refused to pay such indemnities due to suspicions of the employer’s reported injury statistics, and the labor dispute rapidly grew into an open conflict. Presently, ArcelorMittal-Temirtau is confronted with the precipitous fall of demand for its steel production, as markets continue to stagnate and bring prices further down. In January–September 2012, the company’s profits decreased over 12 times as compared to the same period of 2011. A similarly difficult situation is observed at the Eurasian National Resources Corporation, which employs some 65,000 people in Kazakhstan alone (KazTag, August, 23; Newskaz.ru, March 20; Newskaz.ru, October 31, 2012).
Following the Zhanaozen tragedy, the Kazakhstani government has intensified its support to single-industry towns and areas impacted by the slowdown of the country’s industrial growth. It has also become more attentive to nascent labor conflicts, quickly mobilizing local authorities to engage in direct dialogue with both workers and employers. One such recent case is the July 2013 strike by over 200 employees of CAPE Industrial Services, a service company deployed at the Kashagan oil and gas deposit on the Caspian Sea (see EDM, July 23). However, two major factors inhibit these latest efforts. First, the economic crisis is pushing large industrial entities to cut down costs and close unprofitable facilities. In this context, the Kazakhstani government is likely to speed up its diversification plans to create new jobs in innovative fields, even if such reforms are most often highly time-consuming. Second, the central government’s efforts may be challenged by both regional and local controlling interest groups. Therefore, a refurbished command and control structure may be needed to ensure the timely implementation of state policies and prevent the embezzlement of public funds.
Despite the gloomy outlook, Kazakhstan’s GDP is expected to grow by slightly over 5 percent in 2013, more than in most other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries as well as in Europe. The launch of oil production at Kashagan will likely also have a medium- to long-term positive impact on the country’s economic prospects as well as its oil and gas industry. The Kazakhstani government’s efforts to stabilize the socioeconomic situation in places like Zhanaozen will thus receive a sizeable impetus, should these trends be confirmed (IMF, August 14).
--Georgiy Voloshin