Post by peterd on Sept 16, 2013 11:24:09 GMT -8
Putin Tries to Build on the Success of His Syrian Coup
During the last week (see EDM, September 12), the diplomatic dance around Syria has acquired the intensity of a whirling dervish, but the civil war continues very much as usual. This disconnect answers perfectly the ambitions of President Vladimir Putin, who has managed to make himself an indispensable party in this dance on the assumption that, in a short while, all the participants will drop from sheer exhaustion achieving very little, and the war will be left to run its bloody course.
Meanwhile, as US State Secretary John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried their best to make sense of the initiative to establish international control over the Syrian chemical arsenal, Putin partook in the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has no reservations whatsoever about supporting this initiative (Kommersant, September 14). China, for that matter, is ready to grant Russia the leading role in undermining the United States’ efforts at punishing Bashar al-Assad for the crimes against his own people, while gradually turning the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its economic interests in Central Asia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 13). For Putin, the summit provided an opportunity to build on the astonishing success of his Syrian maneuver by opening a dialogue with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and asserting that the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program have a good chance of seeing progress (http://ria.ru/world/20130912/962681737.html).
Moscow also insists that Iran would be a legitimate and, indeed, valuable participant in the still hypothetical Geneva talks on the management of the Syrian conflict, knowing full well that such a format is unacceptable for Washington. This eagerness to create a deadlock shows that Putin has nothing resembling a strategy for the greater Middle East or for any of its particular “hot spots” and aims merely to exploit the opportunities created by the disarray among the Western stake-holders and peace-makers (Vedomosti, September 13).
He remained silent for many days after the chemical attack outside Damascus on August 21 critically reconfigured the Syrian war. And, in fact, he had very little to say on this breach of international law except objecting at the September 5–6 G20 summit in St. Petersburg to the US plan for delivering a limited missile strike (http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/70724). Lavrov was remarkably quick at jumping on Kerry’s remarks regarding Syria’s improbable chemical disarmament, and Putin managed to turn this narrowest of openings into a real coup that derailed President Barack Obama’s drive (reluctant as it was) toward building support for the punishing strike (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=13280). The feasibility of the proposition was never an issue for Moscow, which will make sure to add complications to the fast-negotiated plan for establishing effective control over the storage of weaponized poisons. For all the concerned parties, it is now essential to present this initiative as a result of previous strategic considerations because it is too embarrassing to admit that their joint hard work amounts to executing a far-fetched impromptu plan inspired by an off-the-cuff gaffe (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/lukyanov/5649885.shtml).
The only strategic assumption behind Putin’s stubborn stance against intervention in the deepening humanitarian catastrophe in Syria is that, given time, the al-Assad regime will defeat the rebels and exterminate the extremists. This perceived outcome would constitute proof for the Kremlin’s deeply held ideological belief that revolutions, which bring only chaos and misery, can be suppressed, and goes directly against the US commitment to support democratic transitions and the hopes that every violent conflict has a political solution, expressed so eloquently in Pope Francis’ letter to Putin and the G20 leaders (Kommersant, September 5). Putin is certainly in favor of all kinds of negotiations as a means to grant al-Assad more time for destroying the opposition, and considers the deal on chemical weapons as a major step in eliminating the option for “regime change” (Novaya Gazeta, September 14).
The Russian president’s conviction that the risk of state failure in Syria can be minimized only by the firm application of military force is based on his own experience in the North Caucasus, which he perceives as effectively pacified despite the fact that the smoldering civil war claimed 76 casualties in August (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229851/). He has no clue about what to do with Chechnya. A brutally despotic enclave inside the deeply corrupt Russian body politic, the Chechen Republic constitutes a challenge to the decaying structures of central bureaucratic control that prompt the Russian regime, which has too little energy to turn itself into effective authoritarianism (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/bykov_d/1151456-echo/).
The Russian-led maneuvers around Syria may bring Putin some satisfaction after the irritation caused by Obama’s decision to put the dialogue on “pause,” but this minor diplomatic triumph has hardly any implications for domestic politics. Russians may disapprove of the US propensity to bomb disagreeable dictators, but they have very little sympathy for the al-Assad regime and are more worried than proud of the demonstrative deployment of the Russian Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean (http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130913/962880931.html). Despite the extra-high attention to the Syrian calamity in the official propaganda, it is the worsening economic situation, which Putin is barely able to admit, that increasingly affects the public mood, reducing Syria to a problem Russia should stay clear of (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2013/09/13_a_5651793.shtml). In the absence of income growth, the expansion of consumer credit had sustained the illusion of prosperity in Russia. But this has now reached a critical level, so Russia’s political stability lives on rather short, borrowed time (Vedomosti, September 13).
Bureaucratic disarray and the political feebleness of Putin’s regime, accentuated by the recent regional elections, first of all in Moscow, inevitably translate into foreign policy weakness. Therefore, Moscow’s ability to deliver on any commitments it takes regarding dismantling the Syrian chemical arsenal is quite shaky. Putin’s ambitions for holding center stage nevertheless remain undiminished, and he might find it easier to fulfill them by playing on the divisions inside the disunited West and on the disappointments in Washington’s leadership. Putin’s righteous criticism of US “exceptionalism” may appeal to many who are concerned about the obvious senselessness of limited missile strikes, but it is based on the unshakable belief in his own exceptional right to rule Russia and to speak in its name. But this introverted country is becoming exasperated with such self-aggrandizement and is just about ready to shrug it off.
--Pavel K. Baev
___________________________________________________
Syrian Circassian Refugees in Turkey Ask to Be Repatriated to Russia
The chairman of the Solidarity Committee of World Circassians, Nusret Bas, recently handed over a petition of Circassian refugees from Syria to the Russian consul in Istanbul, Alexei Yerkhov. The appeal was prepared on behalf of 146 Circassian refugees residing in the southern Turkish city of Nizip, which is close to the Syrian border. The refugees said in the petition that their ancestors were displaced from their homeland in 1864 and resettled in Syria. Despite the fact that they have not participated in the civil war in Syria, they have still lost their relatives, homes and property, and were given shelter in Nizip with the assistance of the Solidarity Committee of World Circassians. At his meeting with the Russian Consul, Bas outlined what the Circassians want from Russia. “From Russia we expect two things: first, the recognition of the genocide in the period of 1763–1864; second, preparing conditions for the unconditional, unequivocal return of the Circassians to their historical homeland.”
Bas further reassured Yerkhov that Circassians were not Russia’s enemies. “Radical religious movements do not correspond with the traditions and views of the Circassians,” he told the Russian consul. “Our opposition to the [2014] Olympic Games in Sochi is tied to Russia’s unhelpful policies toward the Circassians. If the policies are amended, there is no doubt that all Circassians will be side by side with Russia.” Yerkhov reportedly promised to give serious consideration to the Circassian activists’ proposals and hand over the petition to Moscow (http://aheku.org/page-id-3657.html).
A meeting of Circassian activists at the Russian Consulate in Istanbul indicates that Moscow may be willing to consider some limited friendly gestures toward the Circassians in the run-up to the Olympics in Sochi. The Syrian crisis and the plight of Circassian refugees present Russia with a convenient opportunity to display that it can accommodate the interests of Circassians. Few Circassians, however, believe that Russia will make actual moves to help refugees from Syria in a meaningful way. Only about 22 percent of the respondents in an Internet poll indicated that they believed Russia would help Circassian refugees from Syria, while almost 68 percent believed Russia would not help and the remaining 10 percent indicated they were not sure (http://aheku.org/polls-id-101.html).
Disbelief in Russia’s good intentions ensures that many Circassians will oppose the Olympics in Sochi. In the meantime, an internal conflict among Circassian civil organizations is intensifying. In July, the Coordination Council of Circassians in Russia called on Circassian organizations worldwide, especially those based in Turkey, to hold a world conference of Circassians dedicated to the situation in Syria. In September, the International Circassian Association (ICA) came out against the proposed conference. The Russian branch of the International Circassian Association is known for its ties to the Russian government and was created by the Russian security services following the Soviet demise in order to regulate contacts with Circassian diaspora groups in the West. The ICA probably influenced its opposition to the conference. One of the proponents of the conference in Turkey, Adam Bogus, who heads the Adygean organization Adyge-Khase/Circassian Parliament, told the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website that the Circassians in Syria were facing deadly danger. “There will be reprisals and bloodshed, it is obvious,” he said. “Essentially, our whole diaspora has been sentenced and is now awaiting execution. Whatever we have tried to do, we could not help them. We sent dozens of petitions to various state institutions, regional as well as federal ones, but we could not elicit any positive reaction.” The director of the Center for Ethno-Religious Problems of the Russian Union of Journalists, Sulieta Chukho-Kusova, stated that the feeble reaction of the Circassian organizations in Russia to the Syrian crisis showed they had no unity, robustness or strong leaders. In addition, he said that “the political leaders of the [Circassian] republics displayed complete national indifference” (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229687/).
It must be said that regional authorities have hijacked many of the Circassian organizations in the North Caucasus, while Moscow has put pressure on the regional authorities to suppress any genuine Circassian movement. In a way, this situation can be seen as a “soft” version of Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya. Moscow offers “sticks and carrots” to the regional authorities and they implement the policies that Moscow wants them to implement. Corruption and dependence on Moscow ensure that regional governments have no social support base among their respective populations and that the central government can thus easily manipulate them.
Circassian activists in Adygea have provided assistance to the families of Circassian refugees from Syria with little or no help from the Russian state. A group of benefactors resolved to pay for the university tuition and living expenses of 16 young Circassian refugees in Adygea. Overall there are 62 students from Syria studying in Adygea (http://www.yuga.ru/news/306391/). An estimated 156 families—708 people in all—have arrived in Adygea from Syria. The population of Syrian Circassian refugees in Adygea decreased to 134 families after some of them moved to Kabardino-Balkaria and Turkey (http://www.adigea.aif.ru/crime/article/37876).
With the approach of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, Moscow is indicating it may make some concessions to the Circassians, but no significant steps to accommodate Circassian interests are likely. Some Circassians are calling for a time of reckoning because the Circassian civil organizations in the North Caucasus have proven to be ineffective in defending the larger population. However, others think there is still time to try to press ahead with the Circassians’ demands on Moscow.
--Valery Dzutsev
____________________________________________________
Russia and Georgia Expand Their Only Border Crossing Point
Several days ago (September 10), reconstruction and expansion works at the Verkhny Lars border checkpoint were completed. The checkpoint, located in Georgia’s Kazbegi district on the highway historically known as the Georgian Military Road, is the only legally functioning border crossing between Russia and Georgia. The other two checkpoints, Nizhny Zaramag and Psou are closed due to the Georgian–South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26440).
Notably, the Georgian Military Road is the only highway that connects not only Georgia, but also Armenia to Russia. Consequently, Yerevan has insisted on opening the highway after Russia imposed a trade embargo against Georgia in 2006 (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25715) and broke all transportation links to it. The United States significantly contributed to resolving this problem and restoring the Verkhny Lars checkpoint. Within the framework of the “reset” policy, Washington sought to relieve the tensions between Russia and Georgia, while advocating for the resumption of bilateral ties. One of the important steps forward was the reconstruction of the border checkpoint to improve its throughput of people and transport. The US government allotted $2.4 million for the crossing’s modernization. The funds were spent not only on the construction of roads, but also on equipment acquisition. All works were finished by September 2009 and the checkpoint started to function at full capacity (http://en.trend.az/news/politics/1534443.html). The checkpoint was able to service 5,000 people per day, but that quickly proved insufficient for the growing numbers of cars and passengers. So a second stage of modernization of the checkpoint ensued, which was finished in the beginning of September 2013.
Now, Verkhny Lars is able to service 13,000 people per day. According to the Georgian Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance, 329,601 people crossed the checkpoint between January and July 2013—more than half of them were Russian citizens. In July 2013, 61,979 Russian citizens crossed into Georgia through this checkpoint, whereas this figure in 2011 and 2012 was 16,113 and 41,331, respectively (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26440).
A local municipality representative told Jamestown that, most frequently, ethnic Ingush and North Ossetians along with other residents of southern Russia cross into Georgia at the checkpoint. “In past years, the number of Muscovites and residents from St. Petersburg has also increased. They come for leisure with their families,” Georgi Tushurashvili, a Kazbegi district official, noted (Author’s interview, September 14).
Many Russians go to Kazbegi and other areas in Georgia to gamble in the casinos. In contrast to the majority of regions of Russia, Georgia has no restrictions on gambling. A luxurious hotel with a huge, fashionable casino recently opened in Kazbegi (http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/995528/). In many instances, Muscovites and St. Petersburgians fly to the capital of North Ossetia, Vladikavkaz, and from there proceed by car to Kazbegi to play blackjack or poker. Many also travel deeper into the country.
The checkpoint at Kazbegi is especially suitable for those who travel to Georgia by car with their families. While the checking of documents on the Russian side of the border takes at least a half an hour, on the Georgian side it is done within five minutes. President Mikheil Saakashvili tried to promote a benevolent attitude toward tourists at the state level. He met with Russian tourists at the Verkhny Lars border checkpoint himself several times, took pictures with them and demonstrated his favorable attitude toward Russians (http://newsgeorgia.ru/politics/20120409/214899173.html). The Georgian leader had two objectives: first, to refute the Russian press’ allegations about his “Russophobia” and second, to personally contribute to Georgia’s tourism development. Tourism under Saakashvili has become the primary driver of Georgia’s GDP growth.
The increase in tourism from Russia is the largest in Georgia. According to Georgia’s Ministry of the Interior, the number of Russians visiting Georgia grew in 2013 by 44.2 percent in comparison to the previous year (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2277399). Most of these tourists crossed the border at Verkhny Lars. Relatively few Russian tourists fly to Georgia as economy-class tickets cost $400. By comparison, a return air ticket from Tbilisi to Istanbul costs half as much.
Tourist flows would be far greater, if Georgia recognized the legitimacy of the other two border checkpoints—Nizhny Zaramag and Psou. However, according to Georgian legislation, any foreigner, including Russian citizens, who visits South Ossetia and Abkhazia via those checkpoints may be arrested and imprisoned for up to four years or subjected to a large fine (http://slon.ru/world/kak_isportit_otpusk_v_gruzii-777461.xhtml). The new Georgian authorities have tried to soften this legislation and liberalize border crossings, but President Saakashvili and his team put up a formidable resistance to the proposed changes. Saakashvili insists on a strict division between a neighborly attitude toward Russian tourists on the one hand, but refusal to accept Russian policies on the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other.
Russian tourists can enter Georgia via the Verkhny Lars checkpoint without visas, while Georgians have to wait in long lines at the Swiss Embassy to receive Russian visas. Moscow made it clear that easing the visa regime with Georgia may take place only after Tbilisi agrees to restore diplomatic relations with Russia. Georgia broke diplomatic relations with Russia after the “Five Days War” in 2008 and subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia.
Despite tense relations between the two governments, guards on both sides of the border along the Georgian Military Road easily find a common language. Source in the interior ministry, of which the Border Department is a part, told Jamestown on September 14 that a “hotline” connects Georgian and Russian border guards and they often exchange information about traffic flows, trying to improve the conditions of travel for passengers and cargo trucks—the latter generally bound for Armenia from Russia.
Armenian drivers often refer to this highway as the “main highway for Armenia” because of its direct link with Russia. The maintenance of this Russian-Armenian connection, which is vital for Yerevan, was made possible after the US convinced Georgian officials not to raise additional demands on Moscow for the removal of the Russian trade embargo on Georgia (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/162886/). Thus, the Verkhny Lars checkpoint became the focal point for the interests of all three countries in the region, offering some degree of hope that tensions will subside over time and the space for mutually beneficial and respectful cooperation will expand.
Verkhny Lars and tourism are not political achievements of the new government of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. All important decisions on the matter had been taken by President Saakashvili, who demonstrated that he had realized the importance of improving relations with the northern neighbor. But further progress will depend on concrete steps being taken from the Russian side.
--Giorgi Menabde
During the last week (see EDM, September 12), the diplomatic dance around Syria has acquired the intensity of a whirling dervish, but the civil war continues very much as usual. This disconnect answers perfectly the ambitions of President Vladimir Putin, who has managed to make himself an indispensable party in this dance on the assumption that, in a short while, all the participants will drop from sheer exhaustion achieving very little, and the war will be left to run its bloody course.
Meanwhile, as US State Secretary John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov tried their best to make sense of the initiative to establish international control over the Syrian chemical arsenal, Putin partook in the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has no reservations whatsoever about supporting this initiative (Kommersant, September 14). China, for that matter, is ready to grant Russia the leading role in undermining the United States’ efforts at punishing Bashar al-Assad for the crimes against his own people, while gradually turning the SCO into a vehicle for advancing its economic interests in Central Asia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 13). For Putin, the summit provided an opportunity to build on the astonishing success of his Syrian maneuver by opening a dialogue with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and asserting that the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program have a good chance of seeing progress (http://ria.ru/world/20130912/962681737.html).
Moscow also insists that Iran would be a legitimate and, indeed, valuable participant in the still hypothetical Geneva talks on the management of the Syrian conflict, knowing full well that such a format is unacceptable for Washington. This eagerness to create a deadlock shows that Putin has nothing resembling a strategy for the greater Middle East or for any of its particular “hot spots” and aims merely to exploit the opportunities created by the disarray among the Western stake-holders and peace-makers (Vedomosti, September 13).
He remained silent for many days after the chemical attack outside Damascus on August 21 critically reconfigured the Syrian war. And, in fact, he had very little to say on this breach of international law except objecting at the September 5–6 G20 summit in St. Petersburg to the US plan for delivering a limited missile strike (http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/70724). Lavrov was remarkably quick at jumping on Kerry’s remarks regarding Syria’s improbable chemical disarmament, and Putin managed to turn this narrowest of openings into a real coup that derailed President Barack Obama’s drive (reluctant as it was) toward building support for the punishing strike (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=13280). The feasibility of the proposition was never an issue for Moscow, which will make sure to add complications to the fast-negotiated plan for establishing effective control over the storage of weaponized poisons. For all the concerned parties, it is now essential to present this initiative as a result of previous strategic considerations because it is too embarrassing to admit that their joint hard work amounts to executing a far-fetched impromptu plan inspired by an off-the-cuff gaffe (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/lukyanov/5649885.shtml).
The only strategic assumption behind Putin’s stubborn stance against intervention in the deepening humanitarian catastrophe in Syria is that, given time, the al-Assad regime will defeat the rebels and exterminate the extremists. This perceived outcome would constitute proof for the Kremlin’s deeply held ideological belief that revolutions, which bring only chaos and misery, can be suppressed, and goes directly against the US commitment to support democratic transitions and the hopes that every violent conflict has a political solution, expressed so eloquently in Pope Francis’ letter to Putin and the G20 leaders (Kommersant, September 5). Putin is certainly in favor of all kinds of negotiations as a means to grant al-Assad more time for destroying the opposition, and considers the deal on chemical weapons as a major step in eliminating the option for “regime change” (Novaya Gazeta, September 14).
The Russian president’s conviction that the risk of state failure in Syria can be minimized only by the firm application of military force is based on his own experience in the North Caucasus, which he perceives as effectively pacified despite the fact that the smoldering civil war claimed 76 casualties in August (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229851/). He has no clue about what to do with Chechnya. A brutally despotic enclave inside the deeply corrupt Russian body politic, the Chechen Republic constitutes a challenge to the decaying structures of central bureaucratic control that prompt the Russian regime, which has too little energy to turn itself into effective authoritarianism (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/bykov_d/1151456-echo/).
The Russian-led maneuvers around Syria may bring Putin some satisfaction after the irritation caused by Obama’s decision to put the dialogue on “pause,” but this minor diplomatic triumph has hardly any implications for domestic politics. Russians may disapprove of the US propensity to bomb disagreeable dictators, but they have very little sympathy for the al-Assad regime and are more worried than proud of the demonstrative deployment of the Russian Navy in the Eastern Mediterranean (http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130913/962880931.html). Despite the extra-high attention to the Syrian calamity in the official propaganda, it is the worsening economic situation, which Putin is barely able to admit, that increasingly affects the public mood, reducing Syria to a problem Russia should stay clear of (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2013/09/13_a_5651793.shtml). In the absence of income growth, the expansion of consumer credit had sustained the illusion of prosperity in Russia. But this has now reached a critical level, so Russia’s political stability lives on rather short, borrowed time (Vedomosti, September 13).
Bureaucratic disarray and the political feebleness of Putin’s regime, accentuated by the recent regional elections, first of all in Moscow, inevitably translate into foreign policy weakness. Therefore, Moscow’s ability to deliver on any commitments it takes regarding dismantling the Syrian chemical arsenal is quite shaky. Putin’s ambitions for holding center stage nevertheless remain undiminished, and he might find it easier to fulfill them by playing on the divisions inside the disunited West and on the disappointments in Washington’s leadership. Putin’s righteous criticism of US “exceptionalism” may appeal to many who are concerned about the obvious senselessness of limited missile strikes, but it is based on the unshakable belief in his own exceptional right to rule Russia and to speak in its name. But this introverted country is becoming exasperated with such self-aggrandizement and is just about ready to shrug it off.
--Pavel K. Baev
___________________________________________________
Syrian Circassian Refugees in Turkey Ask to Be Repatriated to Russia
The chairman of the Solidarity Committee of World Circassians, Nusret Bas, recently handed over a petition of Circassian refugees from Syria to the Russian consul in Istanbul, Alexei Yerkhov. The appeal was prepared on behalf of 146 Circassian refugees residing in the southern Turkish city of Nizip, which is close to the Syrian border. The refugees said in the petition that their ancestors were displaced from their homeland in 1864 and resettled in Syria. Despite the fact that they have not participated in the civil war in Syria, they have still lost their relatives, homes and property, and were given shelter in Nizip with the assistance of the Solidarity Committee of World Circassians. At his meeting with the Russian Consul, Bas outlined what the Circassians want from Russia. “From Russia we expect two things: first, the recognition of the genocide in the period of 1763–1864; second, preparing conditions for the unconditional, unequivocal return of the Circassians to their historical homeland.”
Bas further reassured Yerkhov that Circassians were not Russia’s enemies. “Radical religious movements do not correspond with the traditions and views of the Circassians,” he told the Russian consul. “Our opposition to the [2014] Olympic Games in Sochi is tied to Russia’s unhelpful policies toward the Circassians. If the policies are amended, there is no doubt that all Circassians will be side by side with Russia.” Yerkhov reportedly promised to give serious consideration to the Circassian activists’ proposals and hand over the petition to Moscow (http://aheku.org/page-id-3657.html).
A meeting of Circassian activists at the Russian Consulate in Istanbul indicates that Moscow may be willing to consider some limited friendly gestures toward the Circassians in the run-up to the Olympics in Sochi. The Syrian crisis and the plight of Circassian refugees present Russia with a convenient opportunity to display that it can accommodate the interests of Circassians. Few Circassians, however, believe that Russia will make actual moves to help refugees from Syria in a meaningful way. Only about 22 percent of the respondents in an Internet poll indicated that they believed Russia would help Circassian refugees from Syria, while almost 68 percent believed Russia would not help and the remaining 10 percent indicated they were not sure (http://aheku.org/polls-id-101.html).
Disbelief in Russia’s good intentions ensures that many Circassians will oppose the Olympics in Sochi. In the meantime, an internal conflict among Circassian civil organizations is intensifying. In July, the Coordination Council of Circassians in Russia called on Circassian organizations worldwide, especially those based in Turkey, to hold a world conference of Circassians dedicated to the situation in Syria. In September, the International Circassian Association (ICA) came out against the proposed conference. The Russian branch of the International Circassian Association is known for its ties to the Russian government and was created by the Russian security services following the Soviet demise in order to regulate contacts with Circassian diaspora groups in the West. The ICA probably influenced its opposition to the conference. One of the proponents of the conference in Turkey, Adam Bogus, who heads the Adygean organization Adyge-Khase/Circassian Parliament, told the Kavkazsky Uzel (Caucasian Knot) website that the Circassians in Syria were facing deadly danger. “There will be reprisals and bloodshed, it is obvious,” he said. “Essentially, our whole diaspora has been sentenced and is now awaiting execution. Whatever we have tried to do, we could not help them. We sent dozens of petitions to various state institutions, regional as well as federal ones, but we could not elicit any positive reaction.” The director of the Center for Ethno-Religious Problems of the Russian Union of Journalists, Sulieta Chukho-Kusova, stated that the feeble reaction of the Circassian organizations in Russia to the Syrian crisis showed they had no unity, robustness or strong leaders. In addition, he said that “the political leaders of the [Circassian] republics displayed complete national indifference” (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229687/).
It must be said that regional authorities have hijacked many of the Circassian organizations in the North Caucasus, while Moscow has put pressure on the regional authorities to suppress any genuine Circassian movement. In a way, this situation can be seen as a “soft” version of Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya. Moscow offers “sticks and carrots” to the regional authorities and they implement the policies that Moscow wants them to implement. Corruption and dependence on Moscow ensure that regional governments have no social support base among their respective populations and that the central government can thus easily manipulate them.
Circassian activists in Adygea have provided assistance to the families of Circassian refugees from Syria with little or no help from the Russian state. A group of benefactors resolved to pay for the university tuition and living expenses of 16 young Circassian refugees in Adygea. Overall there are 62 students from Syria studying in Adygea (http://www.yuga.ru/news/306391/). An estimated 156 families—708 people in all—have arrived in Adygea from Syria. The population of Syrian Circassian refugees in Adygea decreased to 134 families after some of them moved to Kabardino-Balkaria and Turkey (http://www.adigea.aif.ru/crime/article/37876).
With the approach of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, Moscow is indicating it may make some concessions to the Circassians, but no significant steps to accommodate Circassian interests are likely. Some Circassians are calling for a time of reckoning because the Circassian civil organizations in the North Caucasus have proven to be ineffective in defending the larger population. However, others think there is still time to try to press ahead with the Circassians’ demands on Moscow.
--Valery Dzutsev
____________________________________________________
Russia and Georgia Expand Their Only Border Crossing Point
Several days ago (September 10), reconstruction and expansion works at the Verkhny Lars border checkpoint were completed. The checkpoint, located in Georgia’s Kazbegi district on the highway historically known as the Georgian Military Road, is the only legally functioning border crossing between Russia and Georgia. The other two checkpoints, Nizhny Zaramag and Psou are closed due to the Georgian–South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26440).
Notably, the Georgian Military Road is the only highway that connects not only Georgia, but also Armenia to Russia. Consequently, Yerevan has insisted on opening the highway after Russia imposed a trade embargo against Georgia in 2006 (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25715) and broke all transportation links to it. The United States significantly contributed to resolving this problem and restoring the Verkhny Lars checkpoint. Within the framework of the “reset” policy, Washington sought to relieve the tensions between Russia and Georgia, while advocating for the resumption of bilateral ties. One of the important steps forward was the reconstruction of the border checkpoint to improve its throughput of people and transport. The US government allotted $2.4 million for the crossing’s modernization. The funds were spent not only on the construction of roads, but also on equipment acquisition. All works were finished by September 2009 and the checkpoint started to function at full capacity (http://en.trend.az/news/politics/1534443.html). The checkpoint was able to service 5,000 people per day, but that quickly proved insufficient for the growing numbers of cars and passengers. So a second stage of modernization of the checkpoint ensued, which was finished in the beginning of September 2013.
Now, Verkhny Lars is able to service 13,000 people per day. According to the Georgian Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance, 329,601 people crossed the checkpoint between January and July 2013—more than half of them were Russian citizens. In July 2013, 61,979 Russian citizens crossed into Georgia through this checkpoint, whereas this figure in 2011 and 2012 was 16,113 and 41,331, respectively (http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26440).
A local municipality representative told Jamestown that, most frequently, ethnic Ingush and North Ossetians along with other residents of southern Russia cross into Georgia at the checkpoint. “In past years, the number of Muscovites and residents from St. Petersburg has also increased. They come for leisure with their families,” Georgi Tushurashvili, a Kazbegi district official, noted (Author’s interview, September 14).
Many Russians go to Kazbegi and other areas in Georgia to gamble in the casinos. In contrast to the majority of regions of Russia, Georgia has no restrictions on gambling. A luxurious hotel with a huge, fashionable casino recently opened in Kazbegi (http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/995528/). In many instances, Muscovites and St. Petersburgians fly to the capital of North Ossetia, Vladikavkaz, and from there proceed by car to Kazbegi to play blackjack or poker. Many also travel deeper into the country.
The checkpoint at Kazbegi is especially suitable for those who travel to Georgia by car with their families. While the checking of documents on the Russian side of the border takes at least a half an hour, on the Georgian side it is done within five minutes. President Mikheil Saakashvili tried to promote a benevolent attitude toward tourists at the state level. He met with Russian tourists at the Verkhny Lars border checkpoint himself several times, took pictures with them and demonstrated his favorable attitude toward Russians (http://newsgeorgia.ru/politics/20120409/214899173.html). The Georgian leader had two objectives: first, to refute the Russian press’ allegations about his “Russophobia” and second, to personally contribute to Georgia’s tourism development. Tourism under Saakashvili has become the primary driver of Georgia’s GDP growth.
The increase in tourism from Russia is the largest in Georgia. According to Georgia’s Ministry of the Interior, the number of Russians visiting Georgia grew in 2013 by 44.2 percent in comparison to the previous year (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2277399). Most of these tourists crossed the border at Verkhny Lars. Relatively few Russian tourists fly to Georgia as economy-class tickets cost $400. By comparison, a return air ticket from Tbilisi to Istanbul costs half as much.
Tourist flows would be far greater, if Georgia recognized the legitimacy of the other two border checkpoints—Nizhny Zaramag and Psou. However, according to Georgian legislation, any foreigner, including Russian citizens, who visits South Ossetia and Abkhazia via those checkpoints may be arrested and imprisoned for up to four years or subjected to a large fine (http://slon.ru/world/kak_isportit_otpusk_v_gruzii-777461.xhtml). The new Georgian authorities have tried to soften this legislation and liberalize border crossings, but President Saakashvili and his team put up a formidable resistance to the proposed changes. Saakashvili insists on a strict division between a neighborly attitude toward Russian tourists on the one hand, but refusal to accept Russian policies on the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other.
Russian tourists can enter Georgia via the Verkhny Lars checkpoint without visas, while Georgians have to wait in long lines at the Swiss Embassy to receive Russian visas. Moscow made it clear that easing the visa regime with Georgia may take place only after Tbilisi agrees to restore diplomatic relations with Russia. Georgia broke diplomatic relations with Russia after the “Five Days War” in 2008 and subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia.
Despite tense relations between the two governments, guards on both sides of the border along the Georgian Military Road easily find a common language. Source in the interior ministry, of which the Border Department is a part, told Jamestown on September 14 that a “hotline” connects Georgian and Russian border guards and they often exchange information about traffic flows, trying to improve the conditions of travel for passengers and cargo trucks—the latter generally bound for Armenia from Russia.
Armenian drivers often refer to this highway as the “main highway for Armenia” because of its direct link with Russia. The maintenance of this Russian-Armenian connection, which is vital for Yerevan, was made possible after the US convinced Georgian officials not to raise additional demands on Moscow for the removal of the Russian trade embargo on Georgia (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/162886/). Thus, the Verkhny Lars checkpoint became the focal point for the interests of all three countries in the region, offering some degree of hope that tensions will subside over time and the space for mutually beneficial and respectful cooperation will expand.
Verkhny Lars and tourism are not political achievements of the new government of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. All important decisions on the matter had been taken by President Saakashvili, who demonstrated that he had realized the importance of improving relations with the northern neighbor. But further progress will depend on concrete steps being taken from the Russian side.
--Giorgi Menabde