Post by peterd on Sept 23, 2013 11:27:15 GMT -8
Russia’s Latest Arctic Gambit
Russia invariably proclaims that its response to the challenges provided by the opening up of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is purely political, diplomatic and peaceful. Yet, much of its behavior is characterized by preemptive military gestures driven by the belief, affirmed by President Vladimir Putin in February 2013, that the Russian Arctic is under threat from other unnamed powers due to the region’s rich energy holdings (kremlin.ru, February 27). Russia’s latest gesture, the dispatching of a large naval detachment along with a naval and air base construction team and scientists to the New Siberian Island archipelago (Novosibirskie Ostrova), is a case in point. All month long, a naval taskforce of three combatant ships led by the nuclear cruiser Petr Veliky (Peter the Great), seven support ships, and four nuclear-powered icebreakers have been sailing to this destination and, upon disembarking, its crews have proceeded to build an air base on Kotelnyi Island at Putin’s express order (kremlin.ru, September 16).
The rationale behind this order and subsequent expedition appears to be primarily geopolitical. Putin talks of establishing an air base in the Far North, along with stationing representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Services, hydrologists and climatologists, to undertake joint work on ensuring the safety and effectiveness of the NSR “so Russia can effectively control this part of its territory.” Russia also apparently intends to build a fixed berth on Kotelnyi Island to make it a port or base for receiving barges and medium-class vessels. Moreover, the Russian government intends to use the port of Tiksi, Sakha Republic, as a base facility to deliver supplies to Kotelnyi Island for that purpose (kremlin.ru, September 16).
The Ministry of Defense openly claims that Russia is reaffirming its control over these important Arctic territories in order to develop the NSR as well as improve the navigational potential of this new maritime route and of the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, the Kotelnyi Island air base is planned to receive AN-72, AN-74 and Il-76 transports and serve as a functioning facility on a year-round and all-weather basis. The base’s runway will supposedly be built with new technologies that are specially intended for these tough climactic conditions, and the facility will be ready to accept air defense missile systems like the Antey-2500 variant of the S-300 to strengthen Russian forces there (Interfax-AVN Online, September 13, 16). The forces deployed on this Arctic island will also carry out unspecified, large-scale (kompleksnyi) operations (Interfax-AVN Online, September 13).
The Russian Navy’s commander-in-chief, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, stated that while the current expedition to the New Siberian Island archipelago primarily aims to collect information on the area’s navigational conditions and its hydrographical situation, “The involvement of the Russian defense ministry in securing the national interests of Russia in the Arctic is necessary because there is a need for clear state security guarantees in this strategic region” (Interfax-AVN Online, September 16). Thus, by all accounts it appears that Russia aims to establish a constant, year-round and all-weather military deployment in the Arctic (Zvezda TV, September 14).
However, the stated rationale behind this deployment as well as the deployment itself, in turn, raise several questions. First of all, beyond a scientific reconnaissance of the surrounding Arctic waters, the military mission appears to be the protection of regional energy deposits and of the NSR. But no such threat is presently detectable, at least to Western observers. Moreover although traffic in the NSR has increased, no drilling has yet been started in either the adjoining Laptev or East Siberian Seas (Barents Observer, September 17).
Second, despite the government’s promises of infrastructure upgrades to meet the severe local conditions, Russia has still not fully come to terms with the devastation wracked by the Soviet Union in the Arctic. And Moscow’s ability to properly monitor developments there may be less robust than advertised. Illustratively, the Norwegian publication Barents Observer reported recently that two nuclear generators from the Soviet period in the Arctic are missing and presumed—though nobody knows for sure—to have washed out to sea (Barents Observer, September 13). This hardly augurs well for Russia’s ability to rebuild or control the local infrastructure. Moreover, if that infrastructure is indeed being rebuilt, as so many reports indicate, altogether newer and different materials may well be needed, which are probably beyond the reach of Russia’s present technological and financial capabilities.
Indeed, at a time of looming budget cuts, including the deferment of some military spending (see EDM, August 6, 13), it is questionable whether or not Moscow can support Putin’s extravagant vision for the Arctic in both civilian and military terms. Moreover, if there is little or no evidence of foreign military activity currently endangering the New Siberian Island complex, does Russia consider the threat to be emanating from the Pacific Ocean side of the Arctic? And if so, against which Pacific actor is Russia preparing? Can it be that despite recent Russian deals with China in the Arctic, Moscow still fears Chinese ambitions in the Far North—especially given the somewhat ambivalent past history of Sino-Russian claims in the Arctic? As is typically the case with the Russian perceptions of the Chinese “threat,” nobody in Moscow is willing to confirm such conjectures. But readers should, as old radio broadcasters used to say, stay tuned for future developments.
--Stephen Blank
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Russian Researchers Say Country on the Brink of National Crisis
On September 19, the Russian polling organization Politekh unveiled its report on inter-ethnic relations in Russia at the Russian Public Chamber. The report detailed a spectacular rise of ethnic nationalism among ethnic Russians and other ethnic groups. The researchers warned that polarization may have serious consequences for the future of the country. The North Caucasus is the most prominent cause of the ethnic cleavages in Russia, according to the researchers. Public Chamber member Alla Gerber told the newspaper Kommersant (September 19): “The country is divided into two parts—the Russian Federation and the North Caucasus, which lives according to its own laws, while nationalism flourishes in the central part of the country.” According to the survey, some Russian republics already can be called Islamic, while 37 percent of ethnic Russians feel they are “humiliated” in their own country. Quite revealingly, the feeling of humiliation is more widespread among ethnic Russians in the central parts of the country—46 percent of those polled in Moscow and St. Petersburg indicated this—than among ethnic Russians who actually live in the North Caucasus (42 percent). Another surprising finding was that 54 percent of ethnic Russians said they supported the idea of restoring the nationality category in Russian internal passports, while only 51 percent of the country’s general population said they supported the idea (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2282356).
The rise of ethnic nationalism is not a new phenomenon in Russia, but it has attracted much attention in the Russian government and media. Speaking at the annual Valdai Club meeting on September 19, President Vladimir Putin recognized that Russia needed to reinvent its identity because neither Imperial Russian nor Soviet nor Western “ultraliberal” ideology suited Russia (http://kremlin.ru/news/19243). While the Russian government has been strenuously reinventing the “Russian national idea” for the past 20 years or so, Russian citizens have already defined what the national idea is for them. According to rights activist Valery Engel, a 2012 a poll showed that about half of the country’s population supported a complete ban on immigration, including migration inside the country. Only 1 percent supported the idea of separating the North Caucasus from Russia. “The majority of the population is not prepared to give up its territories, but at the same time, people are not prepared to support equality for all [residents] who live in the same country,” Engel said. The activist predicted that if the republics of the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga region were to secede from Russia, it would cause a civil war (http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/25112175.html).
In the meantime, there is very little reliable survey data on how Russians actually feel about separating the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation. A 2010 poll by the Novy Region website found that over 73 percent of the respondents were in favor of separating Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia from Russia (http://www.nr2.ru/moskow/314486.html). Russian nationalists even created a special website that allows people to vote for separating the North Caucasus from Russia. So far, 78 percent have voted in favor of separation and 22 percent against it (http://goodbyekavkaz.org). On the other hand, the poll conducted by Politekh found 26 percent of the respondents in favor and 66 percent against the separation of some Russian regions from the Russian Federation. Again, the idea of separating some regions of Russia garnered the largest support in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where 32 percent were in favor and 58 percent against. While there seems to be fairly substantial support for the unity of the country, the issue may be more complicated. The problem may be how the Politekh pollsters asked the question: “Some politicians say that Russia should separate some regions and give them full independence. Do you agree with such an opinion or not?” (http://www.sova-center.ru/files/xeno/politeh-13.pdf). Even though the North Caucasus is implied as the region to be separated, it is not openly stated. So some respondents may have answered “no” because they thought the researchers meant regions other than those in the North Caucasus.
Bewilderingly, Politekh’s researchers say the desire of ethnic Russians to manifest their ethnicity is a “reaction to the demonstrative emphasis on ethnicity by other ethnic groups.” Thus, it would appear that the bias against non-Russian ethnic groups in Russia is apparently so high that it has profoundly affected even academic circles in the country. It is otherwise hard to explain how small ethnic minorities in Russia could be held responsible for ethnic Russians turning to ethnic nationalism. In fact, the Politekh poll provides some confirmation that ethnic nationalism is significantly more profound among ethnic Russians than among ethnic non-Russians. In Russia’s central regions, 55 percent of respondents said they would vote for a candidate of their own ethnic group, i.e. ethnic Russian. In the republics of the North Caucasus, the maximum percentage of those who would vote for a candidate based on ethnicity was in Chechnya, where it was 39 percent. In central Russia, 49 percent of ethnic Russian respondents supported voting for a political party that represents certain ethnic groups, while only 39 percent of the ethnic non-Russian respondents in the North Caucasus supported this. Rather, religious identity appears to play a stronger role. In most of the republics in Russia with Muslim majority populations, 44–49 percent of the respondents said they would vote for an Islamic party. That percentage rose to 68 percent in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Meanwhile, 53 percent of ethnic Russians said they would vote for an Orthodox Christian party (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2282356).
The Politekh survey has some questionable polling techniques, such as telephone interviewing, presumably by ethnic Russians. Still, it represents a little-known new side of Russia as a country deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. Given how the poll was conducted, it was more likely to receive accurate results in ethnic Russian regions than in ethnic non-Russian regions. The remarkable general conclusion of the poll is that ethnic Russians, especially those, residing in the core centers of Russia—Moscow and St. Petersburg—are the most ardent supporters of separating the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation.
--Valery Dzutsev
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Georgia’s Political System Precarious as Ivanishvili Prepares to Resign
Georgia’s billionaire Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili insists he will resign from government and quit politics altogether after the October 27, 2013 presidential election. Ivanishvili first entered politics in October 2011, won the parliamentary elections and took over power at the head of his Georgian Dream coalition in October–November 2012, and will have served only one year as prime minister if he withdraws as announced. He has declared his intention to build up civil society organizations under his leadership and—as is generally understood—munificent sponsorship (see EDM, August 2).
Ivanishvili has all along maintained that he dislikes politics and governance. According to Tbilisi insiders, he resents having to micro-manage the government by force of circumstances. His work style as prime minister bears this out. Ivanishvili operates the government from his Tbilisi palace or his seaside residence near Batumi, relying on a few personal confidants for informal advice, and easily bypassing the cabinet of ministers when announcing his decisions or initiatives. This situation was almost pre-ordained from the outset. The six-party coalition government lacks internal coherence, while its component parties owe their existence and entry into parliament since 2012 mainly to Ivanishvili’s funding (see EDM, July 24, 2012).
Considering the weakness of Georgian institutions, Ivanishvili’s early and unprepared resignation could result in a vacuum at the center of power, with potentially destabilizing consequences (see EDM, September 9). The 2012 regime change halted the institution-building processes that had advanced under the preceding government of the United National Movement (UNM).
Within the current party system, Georgian Dream is Ivanishvili’s proprietary party. The eponymous six-party coalition, forming the parliamentary majority, is too fractious to hold together, once Ivanishvili abandons it. Until now, Ivanishvili has made no attempt to build Georgian Dream as a governing party, and has actually discouraged the coalition parties from creating viable organizations in the country. Ivanishvili has encouraged the Kremlin-friendly Nino Burjanadze to compete against UNM’s candidate for second place in the upcoming presidential election, so as to build up Burjanadze’s party. If this scenario materializes, a Moscow-approved party will enter Georgia’s political system this year for the first time since 1990. The UNM, reduced to minority status and severely harassed by the government, remains nevertheless the most coherent, value-based independent party in Georgia.
Within the executive branch, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor’s Office are being used in part to repress the opposition UNM. The heads of these agencies transitioned in 2012 from Ivanishvili’s private employ directly into the government. Ivanishvili has personally designated Georgian Dream’s presidential candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, and has announced that he would also pick the candidate for prime minister (Civil Georgia, September 9).
Georgian Dream is now moving to curtail the powers of the prime minister, transferring some of those powers to the parliament. Since Ivanishvili plans to step down as prime minister, he is no longer interested in the powers of that office. On the contrary, by reducing its powers, Ivanishvili would deal with a weakened head of government after the handover. The UNM also favors transferring some prerogatives from the prime minister to the parliament. The parliament is currently adopting the corresponding amendments to the constitution by cross-party consensus (Civil Georgia, September 20).
“Co-habitation” between Ivanishvili’s government and President Mikheil Saakashvili was a defining issue for Georgia’s institutional setup during the transitional period from October 2012 (when Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elections) to October–November 2013 (when the presidential election is scheduled and Saakashvili’s term will expire). Co-habitation’s one clear achievement was the UNM’s immediate handover of power to the election winners. Georgia’s partners in Europe and the United States advised the Georgian Dream government to refrain from political misuse of law enforcement agencies against the former government. But with scores of UNM politicians arrested, investigated and prosecuted on, as yet, unsubstantiated charges, political co-habitation cannot be deemed successful. The co-habitation issue is now turning into the issue of how the government treats the political opposition. Within the local self-government system, Georgian Dream has physically taken over district and municipal authorities throughout the country during 2013, without awaiting the local elections that are due to be held country-wide in the spring of 2014.
All this points to erosion of Georgia’s institutional system and, correspondingly, concentration of power in the top leader’s hands. Ivanishvili’s power operates both officially and informally, on both the political and the personal level. Below him, the institutional base looks thinner and more precarious than that which he found when he took over state power. In these circumstances, Ivanishvili’s intention to abandon the governance looks capricious and potentially destabilizing to the political system.
Compounding Ivanishvili’s political supremacy is his capacity to leverage his wealth, which equals almost one half of Georgia’s annual gross domestic product. While intending to abdicate from political power (as seems increasingly likely), Ivanishvili envisages launching several investment and development funds in Georgia, amounting to multi-billion dollar sums. The overall concept involves using parts of his own wealth as seed capital, and attracting larger amounts of foreign capital. At this stage of his planning, he considers creating: 1) an agricultural and rural development fund (this has commenced operations); 2) a sovereign wealth fund to support mainly energy and high-tech projects; and 3) a private investment fund to support new commercial ventures in Georgia (“Remarks by Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili at the Riga Conference in Latvia,” September 7).
How all that would work in practice, and how foreign investors might respond, seems far from clear at this point. Ivanishvili’s resignation from government would at least remove the issue of conflict of interest. In parallel with this role as the country’s chief investor, Ivanishvili looks set to take over Georgia’s civil society as its chief mentor. Whether he intends to retain some levers of political control, bypassing the formal institutional setup, is a critical question for Georgia at this stage.
--Vladimir Socor
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Russia Gradually Expands Its Occupation Zone in Georgia
On September 17, Russian occupation forces in Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia) renewed erecting fences and barbed wire in the Georgian village of Ditsi, which is located on the southern edge of the Russian-occupied Georgian region. Russians once again moved the occupation line hundreds of feet deeper into Georgian-controlled territories, cutting off the village residents’ access to a local cemetery and an irrigation reservoir (Rustavi 2, Civil Georgia, September 17).
This unilateral redrawing of the de facto line of control is just the latest example of Russia trying to seize more Georgian territories beyond those it already occupies. Since 2009, Russia has gradually been expanding the occupation zone in almost all directions—bit by bit, slicing off several miles or even just hundreds of feet of territory deeper into the rest of Georgia on every attempt. As a result, various Georgian villages, sitting on the edge or close to the occupation zone, have lost their orchards, many acres of arable lands, access to schools, drinking and irrigation water reservoirs, cemeteries, and main roads (Civil Georgia, June 21, 2009; May 27–29, 2013; June 4, 2013). By these measures, Russia deliberately affects the livelihoods of local Georgian communities, forcing them to leave the region.
After the September 17 incident, the Georgian government once again appealed to the international community to help halt Russia’s creeping occupation of additional Georgian territories. James Apathurai, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) special representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, expressed concern on his Facebook page about the ongoing developments (times.ge, September 18). Moreover, the United States’ Embassy in Georgia stated that it was “deeply concerned” over the creation of border lines in the region and called for the removal of these barriers (Rustavi 2, September 20). Earlier, in May, the US Department of State also expressed concern over the installation of fences by the Russian troops (Civil Georgia, May 31).
However, Russia does not seem deterred by such statements. On September 22, Russian occupation forces renewed their activities of erecting barbed wire, this time in the village of Dvani, which sits on the southern edge of the occupation zone. Russians moved the occupation line about 1,500 feet deeper into Georgian controlled territory, absorbing additional acres of arable lands, orchards, and portions of the irrigation system—thus adding to the local Georgian population’s desperation (tv.ge, ghn.ge, September 22). This was the second time in two months that the Russian side has moved the occupation line deeper into Dvani (for.ge, September 22). So far, the European Union’s Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, which is deployed to observe the Russian-Georgian ceasefire agreement, has not been particularly effective at arresting this gradually advancing Russian occupation.
It is also noteworthy that the latest Russian encroachment on Georgian territories coincided with a highly provocative interview given by the influential Russian ideologue and unofficial Kremlin mouthpiece Alexander Dugin. In particular, Dugin declared that Georgia’s Samegrelo region (in the western part of the country) will soon follow Abkhazia and South Ossetians in its bid to break away from Georgia. Dugin, in fact, warned Georgia that its disintegration process will not stop there: Adjara and Javakheti will try to separate from the country as well. As he declared, Russia should become involved and support all these separatist movements. Furthermore, he called Georgia a “failed state,” accusing the country of actually being nothing more than a multi-ethnic, artificial construction that tries to impose the idea of single nationhood on others. He suggested that Russia had a role to help and save the nations “oppressed” by Georgians (frontnews.ge, September 22).
Whether through sending warnings by the words of Alexander Dugin or gradually slicing off bits of additional Georgian territories, Moscow is making it clear to Tbilisi that the continuing territorial dismemberment of Georgia will continue. Clearly, the current Georgian government’s policy of rapprochement with Russia is failing to yield tangible results with regard to the occupied Georgian regions. For the time being, Moscow uses its creeping expansion beyond the Tskhinvali region as a pressure point through which it can influence Tbilisi. Moreover, by constantly expanding the occupation zone, Russia tries to keep the flashpoint for conflict alive and, in fact, invites Georgia into an open clash. Evidently, Moscow believes that if it feels it necessary to, it can reactivate this conflict at any time, dragging Georgia into a renewed, wide-scale, devastating conflict, finally shattering even remote dreams of a united, stable and prosperous Georgia. On its own, Georgia is unlikely to be able to stop the creeping Russian advance into Georgian-controlled territories. It needs concrete help from its friends in the West. The failure to arrest this slow-motion process now, may damage short- and medium-term prospects for peace in Georgia and the wider Caucasus region, as well as badly impact the West’s standing not only in Georgia, but elsewhere in the post-Soviet space—where Russia’s position still appears quite strong.
--Vasili Rukhadze
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Russia invariably proclaims that its response to the challenges provided by the opening up of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is purely political, diplomatic and peaceful. Yet, much of its behavior is characterized by preemptive military gestures driven by the belief, affirmed by President Vladimir Putin in February 2013, that the Russian Arctic is under threat from other unnamed powers due to the region’s rich energy holdings (kremlin.ru, February 27). Russia’s latest gesture, the dispatching of a large naval detachment along with a naval and air base construction team and scientists to the New Siberian Island archipelago (Novosibirskie Ostrova), is a case in point. All month long, a naval taskforce of three combatant ships led by the nuclear cruiser Petr Veliky (Peter the Great), seven support ships, and four nuclear-powered icebreakers have been sailing to this destination and, upon disembarking, its crews have proceeded to build an air base on Kotelnyi Island at Putin’s express order (kremlin.ru, September 16).
The rationale behind this order and subsequent expedition appears to be primarily geopolitical. Putin talks of establishing an air base in the Far North, along with stationing representatives of the Ministry of Emergency Services, hydrologists and climatologists, to undertake joint work on ensuring the safety and effectiveness of the NSR “so Russia can effectively control this part of its territory.” Russia also apparently intends to build a fixed berth on Kotelnyi Island to make it a port or base for receiving barges and medium-class vessels. Moreover, the Russian government intends to use the port of Tiksi, Sakha Republic, as a base facility to deliver supplies to Kotelnyi Island for that purpose (kremlin.ru, September 16).
The Ministry of Defense openly claims that Russia is reaffirming its control over these important Arctic territories in order to develop the NSR as well as improve the navigational potential of this new maritime route and of the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, the Kotelnyi Island air base is planned to receive AN-72, AN-74 and Il-76 transports and serve as a functioning facility on a year-round and all-weather basis. The base’s runway will supposedly be built with new technologies that are specially intended for these tough climactic conditions, and the facility will be ready to accept air defense missile systems like the Antey-2500 variant of the S-300 to strengthen Russian forces there (Interfax-AVN Online, September 13, 16). The forces deployed on this Arctic island will also carry out unspecified, large-scale (kompleksnyi) operations (Interfax-AVN Online, September 13).
The Russian Navy’s commander-in-chief, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, stated that while the current expedition to the New Siberian Island archipelago primarily aims to collect information on the area’s navigational conditions and its hydrographical situation, “The involvement of the Russian defense ministry in securing the national interests of Russia in the Arctic is necessary because there is a need for clear state security guarantees in this strategic region” (Interfax-AVN Online, September 16). Thus, by all accounts it appears that Russia aims to establish a constant, year-round and all-weather military deployment in the Arctic (Zvezda TV, September 14).
However, the stated rationale behind this deployment as well as the deployment itself, in turn, raise several questions. First of all, beyond a scientific reconnaissance of the surrounding Arctic waters, the military mission appears to be the protection of regional energy deposits and of the NSR. But no such threat is presently detectable, at least to Western observers. Moreover although traffic in the NSR has increased, no drilling has yet been started in either the adjoining Laptev or East Siberian Seas (Barents Observer, September 17).
Second, despite the government’s promises of infrastructure upgrades to meet the severe local conditions, Russia has still not fully come to terms with the devastation wracked by the Soviet Union in the Arctic. And Moscow’s ability to properly monitor developments there may be less robust than advertised. Illustratively, the Norwegian publication Barents Observer reported recently that two nuclear generators from the Soviet period in the Arctic are missing and presumed—though nobody knows for sure—to have washed out to sea (Barents Observer, September 13). This hardly augurs well for Russia’s ability to rebuild or control the local infrastructure. Moreover, if that infrastructure is indeed being rebuilt, as so many reports indicate, altogether newer and different materials may well be needed, which are probably beyond the reach of Russia’s present technological and financial capabilities.
Indeed, at a time of looming budget cuts, including the deferment of some military spending (see EDM, August 6, 13), it is questionable whether or not Moscow can support Putin’s extravagant vision for the Arctic in both civilian and military terms. Moreover, if there is little or no evidence of foreign military activity currently endangering the New Siberian Island complex, does Russia consider the threat to be emanating from the Pacific Ocean side of the Arctic? And if so, against which Pacific actor is Russia preparing? Can it be that despite recent Russian deals with China in the Arctic, Moscow still fears Chinese ambitions in the Far North—especially given the somewhat ambivalent past history of Sino-Russian claims in the Arctic? As is typically the case with the Russian perceptions of the Chinese “threat,” nobody in Moscow is willing to confirm such conjectures. But readers should, as old radio broadcasters used to say, stay tuned for future developments.
--Stephen Blank
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Russian Researchers Say Country on the Brink of National Crisis
On September 19, the Russian polling organization Politekh unveiled its report on inter-ethnic relations in Russia at the Russian Public Chamber. The report detailed a spectacular rise of ethnic nationalism among ethnic Russians and other ethnic groups. The researchers warned that polarization may have serious consequences for the future of the country. The North Caucasus is the most prominent cause of the ethnic cleavages in Russia, according to the researchers. Public Chamber member Alla Gerber told the newspaper Kommersant (September 19): “The country is divided into two parts—the Russian Federation and the North Caucasus, which lives according to its own laws, while nationalism flourishes in the central part of the country.” According to the survey, some Russian republics already can be called Islamic, while 37 percent of ethnic Russians feel they are “humiliated” in their own country. Quite revealingly, the feeling of humiliation is more widespread among ethnic Russians in the central parts of the country—46 percent of those polled in Moscow and St. Petersburg indicated this—than among ethnic Russians who actually live in the North Caucasus (42 percent). Another surprising finding was that 54 percent of ethnic Russians said they supported the idea of restoring the nationality category in Russian internal passports, while only 51 percent of the country’s general population said they supported the idea (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2282356).
The rise of ethnic nationalism is not a new phenomenon in Russia, but it has attracted much attention in the Russian government and media. Speaking at the annual Valdai Club meeting on September 19, President Vladimir Putin recognized that Russia needed to reinvent its identity because neither Imperial Russian nor Soviet nor Western “ultraliberal” ideology suited Russia (http://kremlin.ru/news/19243). While the Russian government has been strenuously reinventing the “Russian national idea” for the past 20 years or so, Russian citizens have already defined what the national idea is for them. According to rights activist Valery Engel, a 2012 a poll showed that about half of the country’s population supported a complete ban on immigration, including migration inside the country. Only 1 percent supported the idea of separating the North Caucasus from Russia. “The majority of the population is not prepared to give up its territories, but at the same time, people are not prepared to support equality for all [residents] who live in the same country,” Engel said. The activist predicted that if the republics of the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga region were to secede from Russia, it would cause a civil war (http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/25112175.html).
In the meantime, there is very little reliable survey data on how Russians actually feel about separating the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation. A 2010 poll by the Novy Region website found that over 73 percent of the respondents were in favor of separating Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia from Russia (http://www.nr2.ru/moskow/314486.html). Russian nationalists even created a special website that allows people to vote for separating the North Caucasus from Russia. So far, 78 percent have voted in favor of separation and 22 percent against it (http://goodbyekavkaz.org). On the other hand, the poll conducted by Politekh found 26 percent of the respondents in favor and 66 percent against the separation of some Russian regions from the Russian Federation. Again, the idea of separating some regions of Russia garnered the largest support in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where 32 percent were in favor and 58 percent against. While there seems to be fairly substantial support for the unity of the country, the issue may be more complicated. The problem may be how the Politekh pollsters asked the question: “Some politicians say that Russia should separate some regions and give them full independence. Do you agree with such an opinion or not?” (http://www.sova-center.ru/files/xeno/politeh-13.pdf). Even though the North Caucasus is implied as the region to be separated, it is not openly stated. So some respondents may have answered “no” because they thought the researchers meant regions other than those in the North Caucasus.
Bewilderingly, Politekh’s researchers say the desire of ethnic Russians to manifest their ethnicity is a “reaction to the demonstrative emphasis on ethnicity by other ethnic groups.” Thus, it would appear that the bias against non-Russian ethnic groups in Russia is apparently so high that it has profoundly affected even academic circles in the country. It is otherwise hard to explain how small ethnic minorities in Russia could be held responsible for ethnic Russians turning to ethnic nationalism. In fact, the Politekh poll provides some confirmation that ethnic nationalism is significantly more profound among ethnic Russians than among ethnic non-Russians. In Russia’s central regions, 55 percent of respondents said they would vote for a candidate of their own ethnic group, i.e. ethnic Russian. In the republics of the North Caucasus, the maximum percentage of those who would vote for a candidate based on ethnicity was in Chechnya, where it was 39 percent. In central Russia, 49 percent of ethnic Russian respondents supported voting for a political party that represents certain ethnic groups, while only 39 percent of the ethnic non-Russian respondents in the North Caucasus supported this. Rather, religious identity appears to play a stronger role. In most of the republics in Russia with Muslim majority populations, 44–49 percent of the respondents said they would vote for an Islamic party. That percentage rose to 68 percent in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Meanwhile, 53 percent of ethnic Russians said they would vote for an Orthodox Christian party (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2282356).
The Politekh survey has some questionable polling techniques, such as telephone interviewing, presumably by ethnic Russians. Still, it represents a little-known new side of Russia as a country deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines. Given how the poll was conducted, it was more likely to receive accurate results in ethnic Russian regions than in ethnic non-Russian regions. The remarkable general conclusion of the poll is that ethnic Russians, especially those, residing in the core centers of Russia—Moscow and St. Petersburg—are the most ardent supporters of separating the North Caucasus from the Russian Federation.
--Valery Dzutsev
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Georgia’s Political System Precarious as Ivanishvili Prepares to Resign
Georgia’s billionaire Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili insists he will resign from government and quit politics altogether after the October 27, 2013 presidential election. Ivanishvili first entered politics in October 2011, won the parliamentary elections and took over power at the head of his Georgian Dream coalition in October–November 2012, and will have served only one year as prime minister if he withdraws as announced. He has declared his intention to build up civil society organizations under his leadership and—as is generally understood—munificent sponsorship (see EDM, August 2).
Ivanishvili has all along maintained that he dislikes politics and governance. According to Tbilisi insiders, he resents having to micro-manage the government by force of circumstances. His work style as prime minister bears this out. Ivanishvili operates the government from his Tbilisi palace or his seaside residence near Batumi, relying on a few personal confidants for informal advice, and easily bypassing the cabinet of ministers when announcing his decisions or initiatives. This situation was almost pre-ordained from the outset. The six-party coalition government lacks internal coherence, while its component parties owe their existence and entry into parliament since 2012 mainly to Ivanishvili’s funding (see EDM, July 24, 2012).
Considering the weakness of Georgian institutions, Ivanishvili’s early and unprepared resignation could result in a vacuum at the center of power, with potentially destabilizing consequences (see EDM, September 9). The 2012 regime change halted the institution-building processes that had advanced under the preceding government of the United National Movement (UNM).
Within the current party system, Georgian Dream is Ivanishvili’s proprietary party. The eponymous six-party coalition, forming the parliamentary majority, is too fractious to hold together, once Ivanishvili abandons it. Until now, Ivanishvili has made no attempt to build Georgian Dream as a governing party, and has actually discouraged the coalition parties from creating viable organizations in the country. Ivanishvili has encouraged the Kremlin-friendly Nino Burjanadze to compete against UNM’s candidate for second place in the upcoming presidential election, so as to build up Burjanadze’s party. If this scenario materializes, a Moscow-approved party will enter Georgia’s political system this year for the first time since 1990. The UNM, reduced to minority status and severely harassed by the government, remains nevertheless the most coherent, value-based independent party in Georgia.
Within the executive branch, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Prosecutor’s Office are being used in part to repress the opposition UNM. The heads of these agencies transitioned in 2012 from Ivanishvili’s private employ directly into the government. Ivanishvili has personally designated Georgian Dream’s presidential candidate, Giorgi Margvelashvili, and has announced that he would also pick the candidate for prime minister (Civil Georgia, September 9).
Georgian Dream is now moving to curtail the powers of the prime minister, transferring some of those powers to the parliament. Since Ivanishvili plans to step down as prime minister, he is no longer interested in the powers of that office. On the contrary, by reducing its powers, Ivanishvili would deal with a weakened head of government after the handover. The UNM also favors transferring some prerogatives from the prime minister to the parliament. The parliament is currently adopting the corresponding amendments to the constitution by cross-party consensus (Civil Georgia, September 20).
“Co-habitation” between Ivanishvili’s government and President Mikheil Saakashvili was a defining issue for Georgia’s institutional setup during the transitional period from October 2012 (when Georgian Dream won the parliamentary elections) to October–November 2013 (when the presidential election is scheduled and Saakashvili’s term will expire). Co-habitation’s one clear achievement was the UNM’s immediate handover of power to the election winners. Georgia’s partners in Europe and the United States advised the Georgian Dream government to refrain from political misuse of law enforcement agencies against the former government. But with scores of UNM politicians arrested, investigated and prosecuted on, as yet, unsubstantiated charges, political co-habitation cannot be deemed successful. The co-habitation issue is now turning into the issue of how the government treats the political opposition. Within the local self-government system, Georgian Dream has physically taken over district and municipal authorities throughout the country during 2013, without awaiting the local elections that are due to be held country-wide in the spring of 2014.
All this points to erosion of Georgia’s institutional system and, correspondingly, concentration of power in the top leader’s hands. Ivanishvili’s power operates both officially and informally, on both the political and the personal level. Below him, the institutional base looks thinner and more precarious than that which he found when he took over state power. In these circumstances, Ivanishvili’s intention to abandon the governance looks capricious and potentially destabilizing to the political system.
Compounding Ivanishvili’s political supremacy is his capacity to leverage his wealth, which equals almost one half of Georgia’s annual gross domestic product. While intending to abdicate from political power (as seems increasingly likely), Ivanishvili envisages launching several investment and development funds in Georgia, amounting to multi-billion dollar sums. The overall concept involves using parts of his own wealth as seed capital, and attracting larger amounts of foreign capital. At this stage of his planning, he considers creating: 1) an agricultural and rural development fund (this has commenced operations); 2) a sovereign wealth fund to support mainly energy and high-tech projects; and 3) a private investment fund to support new commercial ventures in Georgia (“Remarks by Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili at the Riga Conference in Latvia,” September 7).
How all that would work in practice, and how foreign investors might respond, seems far from clear at this point. Ivanishvili’s resignation from government would at least remove the issue of conflict of interest. In parallel with this role as the country’s chief investor, Ivanishvili looks set to take over Georgia’s civil society as its chief mentor. Whether he intends to retain some levers of political control, bypassing the formal institutional setup, is a critical question for Georgia at this stage.
--Vladimir Socor
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Russia Gradually Expands Its Occupation Zone in Georgia
On September 17, Russian occupation forces in Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia) renewed erecting fences and barbed wire in the Georgian village of Ditsi, which is located on the southern edge of the Russian-occupied Georgian region. Russians once again moved the occupation line hundreds of feet deeper into Georgian-controlled territories, cutting off the village residents’ access to a local cemetery and an irrigation reservoir (Rustavi 2, Civil Georgia, September 17).
This unilateral redrawing of the de facto line of control is just the latest example of Russia trying to seize more Georgian territories beyond those it already occupies. Since 2009, Russia has gradually been expanding the occupation zone in almost all directions—bit by bit, slicing off several miles or even just hundreds of feet of territory deeper into the rest of Georgia on every attempt. As a result, various Georgian villages, sitting on the edge or close to the occupation zone, have lost their orchards, many acres of arable lands, access to schools, drinking and irrigation water reservoirs, cemeteries, and main roads (Civil Georgia, June 21, 2009; May 27–29, 2013; June 4, 2013). By these measures, Russia deliberately affects the livelihoods of local Georgian communities, forcing them to leave the region.
After the September 17 incident, the Georgian government once again appealed to the international community to help halt Russia’s creeping occupation of additional Georgian territories. James Apathurai, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) special representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, expressed concern on his Facebook page about the ongoing developments (times.ge, September 18). Moreover, the United States’ Embassy in Georgia stated that it was “deeply concerned” over the creation of border lines in the region and called for the removal of these barriers (Rustavi 2, September 20). Earlier, in May, the US Department of State also expressed concern over the installation of fences by the Russian troops (Civil Georgia, May 31).
However, Russia does not seem deterred by such statements. On September 22, Russian occupation forces renewed their activities of erecting barbed wire, this time in the village of Dvani, which sits on the southern edge of the occupation zone. Russians moved the occupation line about 1,500 feet deeper into Georgian controlled territory, absorbing additional acres of arable lands, orchards, and portions of the irrigation system—thus adding to the local Georgian population’s desperation (tv.ge, ghn.ge, September 22). This was the second time in two months that the Russian side has moved the occupation line deeper into Dvani (for.ge, September 22). So far, the European Union’s Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, which is deployed to observe the Russian-Georgian ceasefire agreement, has not been particularly effective at arresting this gradually advancing Russian occupation.
It is also noteworthy that the latest Russian encroachment on Georgian territories coincided with a highly provocative interview given by the influential Russian ideologue and unofficial Kremlin mouthpiece Alexander Dugin. In particular, Dugin declared that Georgia’s Samegrelo region (in the western part of the country) will soon follow Abkhazia and South Ossetians in its bid to break away from Georgia. Dugin, in fact, warned Georgia that its disintegration process will not stop there: Adjara and Javakheti will try to separate from the country as well. As he declared, Russia should become involved and support all these separatist movements. Furthermore, he called Georgia a “failed state,” accusing the country of actually being nothing more than a multi-ethnic, artificial construction that tries to impose the idea of single nationhood on others. He suggested that Russia had a role to help and save the nations “oppressed” by Georgians (frontnews.ge, September 22).
Whether through sending warnings by the words of Alexander Dugin or gradually slicing off bits of additional Georgian territories, Moscow is making it clear to Tbilisi that the continuing territorial dismemberment of Georgia will continue. Clearly, the current Georgian government’s policy of rapprochement with Russia is failing to yield tangible results with regard to the occupied Georgian regions. For the time being, Moscow uses its creeping expansion beyond the Tskhinvali region as a pressure point through which it can influence Tbilisi. Moreover, by constantly expanding the occupation zone, Russia tries to keep the flashpoint for conflict alive and, in fact, invites Georgia into an open clash. Evidently, Moscow believes that if it feels it necessary to, it can reactivate this conflict at any time, dragging Georgia into a renewed, wide-scale, devastating conflict, finally shattering even remote dreams of a united, stable and prosperous Georgia. On its own, Georgia is unlikely to be able to stop the creeping Russian advance into Georgian-controlled territories. It needs concrete help from its friends in the West. The failure to arrest this slow-motion process now, may damage short- and medium-term prospects for peace in Georgia and the wider Caucasus region, as well as badly impact the West’s standing not only in Georgia, but elsewhere in the post-Soviet space—where Russia’s position still appears quite strong.
--Vasili Rukhadze
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