Post by peterd on Nov 25, 2013 15:43:11 GMT -8
*Moscow pressures Kyiv into backing away from European Union
*…while Russia looks set to compete with the EU over Georgia
*Dagestani president subdivides republic into four new administrative areas
*Azerbaijan and Turkey build on their strategic relationship
**New on the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
--Russia’s Cossacks Increasingly Diverse, Numerous and Important By Paul Goble
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Putin’s Ukrainian Triumph Is a Major Setback for Russia
The Ukrainian government’s shocking decision to put on hold the process of finalizing the Association Agreement with the European Union, announced last Thursday (November 21), a week prior the momentous Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, could be interpreted as Russia’s success in sabotaging Kyiv’s “European choice” (see EDM, November 22). President Vladimir Putin expressed his resolute disapproval of the long-prepared EU-Ukraine agreement two months ago at the pompous meeting of the Valdai Club. And he now prepares to savor the triumph of his ill will, while accusing the EU of attempting to “blackmail” Ukraine to cancel the cancellation (http://ria.ru/world/20131122/979024045.html). The absurdity of this accusation is underscored by the fact that he personally orchestrated the most blatant bullying of Ukraine’s leadership and made President Viktor Yanukovych a proverbial offer that could not be refused at the “secret” meeting staged on November 9, at the Novo-Ogarevo presidential residence outside Moscow (http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/11/22/fail/). In reality, however, this forced turn in Ukraine’s maneuvering between the EU and Russia could signify a major setback for Russia’s own needs to re-energize the country’s modernization.
It is the economy that is commonly assumed to be the central subject in tri-lateral controversies, and indeed, Russia’s not-so-gentle squeeze on Ukraine’s exports has seriously aggravated the latter’s economic troubles. Kyiv cannot realistically expect that an agreement with the EU would compensate for the sanctions that Moscow has threatened to apply, but neither can it cope with the demands from the International Monetary Fund to eliminate subsidies and cut the budget deficit (http://polit.ru/article/2013/11/22/al221113/). Yanukovich may, on the other hand, count on tangible economic “gifts” from Russia—first of all a discount on the natural gas price, which determines Ukraine’s trade deficit (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 18). Putin, however, is not known for a generous disposition, particularly at the expense of Gazprom, which still has a market capitalization some 60 percent lower than in mid-2008; he is deeply worried about the stagnation of Russia’s economy that pulls the federal budget into the “red zone” (Kommersant, Novye izvestiya, November 21). Consequently, instead of a respite from its downward economic spiral, Ukraine might experience a painful crisis spasm if it links its economy too closely to Russia’s (http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/mir/247736-vo-chto-oboidetsya-ukraine-otkaz-ot-assotsiatsii-s-evrosoyuzom).
For the Ukrainians, it will be clear where to allocate the blame; and Putin, who is seriously unpopular now, is set to become the mastermind of a disaster (http://grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.221433.html). Yanukovych may weather the storm of instant protests, but the deepening domestic discontent, which has already taken the catchy name “Euro-Maidan,” is likely to destroy his plans for re-election in 2015 (Novaya Gazeta, November 22). It is in these political calculations and manipulations that the real reason for Ukraine’s failure to connect with the EU is hidden. Brussels has not promised Kyiv much in short-term economic benefits but, rather, demanded of Ukraine greater transparency in financial flows, harsher measures against corruption, and firmer commitments to democratic reforms. These demands are rather discomforting for Yanukovych and the oligarchic clans that are backing him, but for Putin they constitute a direct security challenge. Therefore, the proposal to hold joint EU-Ukraine-Russia talks for optimizing the partnership is merely a hoax (Kommersant, November 23).
The fact of the matter is that Russia, under Putin’s newest term as president, has resolutely moved from a partnership (awkward as it was) to outright hostility in relations with the EU, driven not so much by economic or gas-political tensions as by conflict between European values and the authoritarian code according to which Russia is ruled. Ukraine is caught in this conflict and, as former prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Timoshenko has warned Yanukovych from her prison cell, breaking the deal with the EU will force the Ukrainian head of state to now follow the Russian “road map” (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1203414-echo/). The Ukrainians know how to rid themselves of such leadership, but a deeper problem is that Russia’s attempt to establish its own “civilizational model” and geopolitical “center of gravity” is effectively self-defeating (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/nikolaev/s62993/5760693.shtml). A Ukraine associated with the EU could have been a useful connection to the troubled but pivotal realm of economic activity and political modernization; a Ukraine associated with the dysfunctional Custom Union becomes a crushing burden for Russia.
Putin probably understands that the Vilnius “victory” over the unfriendly EU reduces Russia’s partnership with Europe to mere co-existence. So he has tried to execute his own eastward “pivot” by travelling to Vietnam and South Korea and by exploiting to the maximum his accidental achievement in securing Syria’s chemical disarmament (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/lukyanov/5762601.shtml). He particularly wanted to elevate relations with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but their personal chemistry did not prevent the bitter disagreements over Syria to prevail in the annual meeting of the bilateral Russia-Turkey Cooperation Council (Kommersant, November 23). Putin was also unable to give a meaningful answer to Erdogan’s direct request to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where China has the decisive voice (http://ria.ru/world/20131122/979030661.html). The breakthrough in the long-deadlocked negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program was achieved essentially by the United States’ efforts through back-channels, which not only devalues Putin’s success in letting the Syrian civil war rage without interference but also boosts the prospect that renewed flows of Iranian oil might push down the price on the global market (http://newsru.com/world/24nov2013/agreed.html).
In a peculiar way, every victory that Moscow manages to score on the international arena exposes the underlying weakness of its ambition to be accepted to the ranks of “sovereign” players who allegedly decide the fate of the multi-polar world. Guarding anxiously this all-important “sovereignty,” Russia finds itself in a far-from-splendid isolation as neighbors grow wary of its egocentric behavior; even allied Belarus resorts to blackmail to obtain new gratuities from Russia.
This isolation seriously deforms the growth of Russian civil society. Putin’s security services personnel (siloviki), obsessed with exterminating the alleged security threat posed by foreign-sponsored non-governmental organizations (NGO), try to make an object lesson in deterrence-by-punishment by prosecuting the Greenpeace activists, who dared to protest against Gazprom’s drilling in the Arctic. The outrage in the international eco-milieu is so strong that Russian authorities had to backtrack and release 29 out of the “Arctic 30” on bail, while facing the verdict of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to release the captured Arctic Sunrise Greenpeace vessel (http://lenta.ru/news/2013/11/23/refuse/).
Putin’s iron grip on Yanukovych’s policy choices is certain to mobilize millions of Ukrainians who see no alternative to the European choice, but Russia will discover that its own hard climb to Europe from the quagmire of Putinism has just become yet another degree steeper.
--Pavel K. Baev
Georgia Between Russia and the European Union: Toward the Vilnius Summit and Beyond
(Part One)
Georgia’s Western orientation is the legacy of former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s government (2003–2012), which ended the predecessor governments’ equivocations. A tradition-bound society with almost no historical experience of Europe, very limited comprehension of European norms and values, and isolated during the past two centuries within the Russian and Soviet empires, was now being told by a young Westernized elite group in power that the country’s place is in Europe. For almost a decade, that incessant message, along with the government’s reforms and the magnetic attraction of Europe itself, generated overwhelming popular support for Georgia’s Western course, and opened the way toward an association agreement with the European Union.
The Georgian Dream government of Bidzina Ivanishvili (prime minister, November 2012–November 2013, succeeded by Irakli Gharibashvili—see EDM, November 4) inherited both the pro-Western national consensus and the reforms that qualified Georgia for association with the EU. The Georgian Dream government has adopted that heritage. It will initial the association agreement with the EU at the November 28–29 summit in Vilnius under the EU’s Lithuanian presidency, and expects the agreement to be signed and enter into force during 2014.
On the other hand, the Georgian Dream government came to power on a pledge to improve relations with a hostile Russia (see EDM, March 14, 2012). The two declared goals—advancing Georgia’s Western orientation while reducing tensions with Russia—are mutually contradictory. In the run-up to the Vilnius summit, the Georgian government clearly prioritizes the Western track over the Russian one.
Russia’s current policy objectives toward Georgia include:
•Precluding Georgia’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or any significant steps (e.g., a membership action plan) that would lead toward NATO accession. Perpetuating Georgia’s military vulnerability vis-à-vis Russian forces deployed in the occupied territories;
•Inducing Georgia to shift toward a “balanced,” two-vector policy;
•Shaping Georgian public opinion toward rebuilding economic and cultural ties with Russia based on the “common past”;
•Discouraging investments that would further develop oil and gas pipelines through the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey corridor to Europe, particularly gas from Central Asia;
•Delaying the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad project; promoting, instead, restoration of the railroad from Russia via Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia to Armenia; using this railroad as a transportation corridor in the event that Armenia completes its accession to the Russia-led Customs Union (see EDM, January 31, October 17);
•Laying the ground for Russian-Georgian joint business ventures in Georgia, so as to develop local interest groups vested in closer ties with Russia (see EDM, February 6);
•Restoring some form of diplomatic relations with Georgia even as Russia continues to occupy, “recognize,” and maintain diplomatic missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see EDM, November 13, 2012);
•Devaluing Western verbal support for Georgia’s territorial integrity by perpetuating the Russian occupation, brazenly disregarding the West’s position. Waiting for Western fatigue to take hold on this issue, and inducing Georgia in due course to explore some “solution” with Russia. Ultimately, holding out the possibility of trading off Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation for a Russian-approved pseudo-solution to the territories’ status.
In pursuit of those goals, Russia holds or is fashioning a range of economic and political instruments to exert leverage on Georgia:
•Visa and migrant labor policy: Given Georgia’s heavy reliance on labor remittances from Russia, the Russian government seeks political concessions in return for restoring visa-free travel of Georgian citizens to Russia. Thus, Moscow claims that visa-free travel is impossible as long as bilateral diplomatic relations are not restored and the embassies are not reopened. The intent is to pressure Tbilisi to abandon its own position of keeping diplomatic relations from being restored as long as Russia maintains “embassy”-level relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.
Indeed, Moscow may eventually ask Georgia to accede to certain Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreements (i.e., return to the CIS), as a condition to restoring visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to Russia and unimpeded access to the Russian market for Georgian products. Meanwhile, Russia’s citizens enjoy visa-free travel to Georgia, unilaterally granted by the allegedly “anti-Russian” United National Movement (UNM) government. Russia’s top negotiator with Georgia, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Grigory Karasin, made clear that Russia would move slowly on these issues when he met with his Georgian counterpart, Zurab Abashidze, for the fifth time since the launch of this format almost one year ago (Interfax, Civil Georgia, November 21).
•Market access: Following Georgia’s regime change, Russia lifted the politically motivated bans it had earlier imposed on Georgian grapes and other fruit, wines, and mineral water. Last month, Russia enlarged the list of fruit and vegetable produce allowed to enter the Russian market (Civil Georgia, October 11).
These steps are undoubtedly welcome to many Georgian producers, and politically helpful to the Georgian Dream government. In the longer term, however, reverting to dependence on the Russian market would slow down Georgian efforts to upgrade product quality to European Union standards (a lesson successfully learned by the Baltic States more than ten years ago). Moreover, access to the Russian market is unreliable due to Moscow’s political manipulation of this issue (see EDM, October 10, 11). If Russian companies establish joint ventures in Georgia to “ensure” the access of local produce to the Russian market, and Georgia becomes more reliant on Russian investments, then it might be a question of time until Russia begins applying pressures or inducements to Georgia to join the Russia-led Customs Union.
•Political influence: Moscow will probably encourage the growth of a pro-Russia political party, which will phrase its message as advocating a “balanced policy” for Georgia. The Kremlin openly promoted former parliament chairwoman Nino Burjanadze’s group for that role during the final years of the Saakashvili administration (see EDM, November 22). Burjanadze took third place in the October 2013 presidential election with 10 percent of the votes cast, behind Georgian Dream winner Giorgi Margvelashvili’s 62 percent and UNM’s Davit Bakradze’s 22 percent. Moscow will almost certainly seek to broaden the range of its political connections in Georgia beyond Burjanadze. It will probably also seek out business partners for Russian companies in Georgia, let such local partners grow rich and expect them to influence the country’s politics. Although Georgia will be initialing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in Vilnius, prospective international investments in Georgia at the moment are largely of non-EU origin (www.fund.ge, accessed November 24).
As in other ex-Soviet countries with multi-party competitive politics (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova), Russia will probably try to maneuver some Georgian politicians into demonstrating that they can manage relations with Russia more beneficially for Georgia than their local rivals could. Moscow will undoubtedly persist with courting the Georgian Orthodox Church, so as to cement a common front against Western influence on society. Influential elements in the Georgian Church share this perspective. Nevertheless, the Georgian Church will continue objecting to the Russian occupation of territories that it regards as Georgia’s.
--Vladimir Socor
Dagestan’s President Proposes Another Level of Bureaucracy for the Republic
On November 21, Dagestan’s President Ramazan Abdulatipov made a surprising statement about possible administrative changes in the republic. Speaking at a government meeting in Makhachkala, Abdulatipov said that Dagestan would be subdivided into four areas, each with its own plenipotentiary representative reporting to the head of the republic. The four area representatives would answer to the head of Dagestan and, together with republic’s prime minister and speaker of the republican parliament, inform him about the situation in the republic on a weekly basis. In an interview with the Gazeta.ru website, the Dagestani president’s press-secretary, Magomedbek Akhmedov, said that Abdulatipov believes “there is not enough feedback,” inasmuch as “the information he is receiving is not sufficient. He needs his own representatives and in order to avoid opening representatives’ offices in each raion, the raions will be grouped into districts” (http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/11/21_a_5763977.shtml).
Dagestan is currently divided into 42 raions and 10 cities—52 administrative entities in all. The smallest of the raions, the Bezhtinsky territory, has a population of a little more than 7,000 residents. The largest among the raions, Khasavyurt raion, has a population of over 140,000. The capital of the republic, Makhachkala, is home to over 570,000 people or about 20 percent of the total republican population (Russian State Statistical Service, Gks.ru). The proposed administrative changes fit into the logic of the Russian authorities and their representatives in the North Caucasus. Since meaningful political reforms are practically taboo, administrative changes are advanced instead, with the aim of increasing the level of the government control over the population. The top-down approach, however, has its natural limitations and is rarely sufficient to reap the hoped-for results.
Dagestani expert Enver Kisriev told Gazeta.ru: “The president [of Dagestan] apparently thinks that if instead of forty subjects only four report to him, it will be easier for him to understand the situation, but this is an extremely dangerous assumption. The republic has clear ethnographic and geographic sub-regions. So setting up such structures will promote political rivalries between those sub-regions. Another chain-of-command, and another source of conflict between the head of republic and heads of raions, will be created. This is an additional factor for instability.” Abdulatipov’s press-secretary said the division of Dagestan may follow the pattern of the lines between the republic’s electoral districts, dividing the republic into Northern, Central, Southern and Mountainous districts (http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/11/21_a_5763977.shtml).
Experts warn that ethnic differences in Dagestan could explode if the republic is divided into sub-regions. Dagestan is the most ethnically heterogeneous republic in the North Caucasus. The largest ethnic group, the Avars, comprise only 29 percent of the total republican population. Ethnic Dargins come in second, with 17 percent. The Turkic-speaking Kumyks come in third, with 15 percent. Ethnic Lezgins come in fourth, with 13 percent, and so on (2010 Russian census results, Gks.ru). The smaller ethnic groups, such as the Laks, Nogais, Lezgins and others, have repeatedly raised the issue of seceding from Dagestan and creating separate home republics for their ethnicities. Lezgins, for example, are concentrated in southern Dagestan, while Nogais are concentrated in northern Dagestan. Dividing Dagestan into four sub regions could reignite the old separatist trends in the republic.
It is still unclear whether Moscow was behind this initiative or if Abdulatipov decided to create the new administrative structure on his own. In any case, Dagestan will not be subdivided unless Moscow approves of the move. If Moscow is orchestrating the division of Dagestan behind the scenes, it means that the Russian government essentially has abandoned hope of controlling the situation in the republic in its current form. Dividing Dagestan would supposedly pit the neighboring sub-regions against each other and make Moscow better off in terms of controlling them—in other words, by establishing a new version of divide and rule. The desperation of the Russian government and willingness to make use of extreme measures is reflected in the intense number of rumors, which have been spreading throughout Dagestan. According to one rumor, the Russian army plans to launch a large-scale military operation in Dagestan soon after the Winter Olympics are held in Sochi in February 2014. Moscow’s envoy to the North Caucasus, Alexander Khloponin, rejected this rumor at a meeting with Dagestani journalists (http://www.riadagestan.ru/news/politics/budet_li_masshtabnaya_voyskovaya_operatsiya_v_dagestane_posle_olimpiyskikh_igr_v_sochi/).
Perhaps, one of the most vexing aspects of Dagestan in the eyes of Moscow is that the perpetrators of attacks in Russia proper still come from the republic. In October, another female suicide bomber from Dagestan carried out an attack in the Russian city of Volgograd, killing eight people, including the attacker herself. Attacks inside Dagestan do not receive nearly as much attention in the Russian media and have become routine. On November 20, two men, 26-year-old Magomed Akhmednabiev and 24-year-old Islam Akhmedov, along with their wives, were killed by security forces in the village of Novosasitli in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district. One of the females was identified as 26-year-old Suzanna Magomedova (http://ria.ru/incidents/20131121/978756663.html). A counter-terrorist operation regime was introduced in two different areas of Dagestan on November 21, including part of the republican capital Makhachkala and the Shamil raion in the republic’s mountains (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/233854/). That day, a suspected militant was killed in Shamil raion while another suspect was killed in Tabasaran raion the following day (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/233944/).
Whether the republican’s government’s tentative decision to create sub-regions in Dagestan stems from the republic’s president or directly from Moscow, the planned move shows that the government is dissatisfied with the situation in the republic. Administrative reform in Dagestan may, however, become a trigger not only for unpredictable changes in the republic, but also may create greater demand for administrative changes, specifically border shifts, elsewhere in the North Caucasus.
--Valery Dzutsev
Implications of Ilham Aliyev’s Visit to Turkey
Following his re-election on October 9, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s first official foreign visit was to Turkey. During the November 12–13 visit, Aliyev met with Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Cemil Cicek. President Gul awarded his Azerbaijani counterpart the State Medal of Honor, and Aliyev reciprocated by also awarding the State Medal of Honor to the Turkish head of state. In addition to visiting the Turkish Aerospace Industries, Presidents Gul and Aliyev held the third meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, during which time, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed seven agreements (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-ile-azerbaycan-cumhuriyeti-arasinda-13-kasim-2013-tarihinde-duzenlenen-yuksek-duzeyli-stratejik-isbirligi-ko.tr.mfa).
During a state dinner with Gul, Aliyev emphasized Turkey’s emergence as a world power by proclaiming, “A strong Turkey means a strong Azerbaijan.” He argued that that the 21st century will be the century of the Turkic world and asserted that Azerbaijan and Turkey are leading the way in this direction (tccb.gov.tr, November 12). The expression that the 21st century will be a Turkic century was first uttered by the former president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, in the early 1990s in his foreign policy overtures toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia. So what does it mean for the leader of Azerbaijan to use this slogan, especially considering that Baku has generally tried to maintain a balance in its foreign policy?
Aliyev’s visit to Turkey occurred against the background of both Azerbaijan and Turkey questioning their relations with the West. In particular, Prime Minister Erdogan has openly suggested that Turkey should join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Russia-led Customs Union (see EDM, July 25, November 8) instead of the EU, and also selected a Chinese company in a tender for air-defense equipment over a Western partner (see EDM, October 25). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s relations with the West faltered in September 2013, in relation to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s announcement that Yerevan was ready to join the Russia-led Custom Union rather than pursue the Association Agreement with the European Union. Baku believed that Sargsyan’s announcement in favor of the Customs Union over closer ties with Europe would compel Brussels to apply sanctions against Armenia. But the lack of a forceful response from the EU looked to Baku like a European double standard toward Armenia and Azerbaijan—a double standard that Baku also sees being applied by the EU toward the unresolved issue of Karabakh (http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/246207--yukari-karabagda-cifte-standart-uygulaniyor)
Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States have also experienced increased tension recently. The October 9 presidential elections in Azerbaijan were criticized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) for failing to reach international standards. And the US State Department’s uncritical acceptance of the ODIHR report (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215283.htm) has soured relations between Washington and Baku. The critical statements by ODIHR and the State Department even inspired a group of Azerbaijani columnists and newspaper editors to write an open letter to President Aliyev asking him not to go to the upcoming EU Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, scheduled for November 28–29. Instead, they suggested the SCO could be a better choice for Azerbaijan (http://www.1news.az/politics/20131018015817874.html).
In contrast to the West’s reaction, Turkish President Gul was one of the first leaders to congratulate President Aliyev on his re-election on October 9. Moreover, Turkish election observers both from the OSCE mission and Turkey’s Parliamentary Assembly submitted positive reports on the Azerbaijani elections, which boosted relations and enhanced bilateral trust between the two countries. Ankara clearly does not want to intervene in the domestic relations of this friendly South Caucasus country. Over the course of Ilham Aliyev’s decade in power, the bilateral relationship has been dominated by strategically important developments including the launching of the Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum natural gas pipeline (BTE, also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline), the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway signed in 2007, and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) project signed in 2012. All these projects support Turkey’s strategic role as a bridge between the West and East. Meanwhile Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR has invested $5 billion in Turkey and plans to invest $15–17 billion by 2017 (http://www.socar.com.tr/en/content/ilham-aliyev-president-republic-azerbaijan).
Parallel to Baku’s tension with the West, Russia has made provocative statements about Azerbaijani migrants to Russia and the volatile situation in Karabakh, which some experts have interpreted as pressure on Azerbaijan to join the Custom Union. According to the director of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan, Farhad Mammadov, annually Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia transfer $1.5 billion in remittances to Azerbaijan. But he notes that these guest workers’ contributions to the Russian economy are arguably even higher, so if they were forced to all return home, it would negatively affect not just Azerbaijan, but the Russian economy as well (http://www.1news.az/politics/20131029030651823.html).
Russia’s second source of pressure on Azerbaijan has consisted of veiled threats about the breakaway Azerbaijani territory of Karabakh. After Armenian writer Zori Balayan wrote a letter to the Russian government asking Moscow to unite Karabakh with Russia, Russian Duma deputy Roman Hudyakov echoed the possibility of such a scenario. Then, Andrey Ruzinsky, the commander of Russia’s troops stationed in Armenia, for the first time openly declared that if Azerbaijan tries to restore its jurisdiction over Karabakh by force, personnel from the Russian military base may join in the armed conflict (http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/11/11/takepart/).
Western countries gave no real response to Russian threats. In contrast, the second article of the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan, signed on August 16, 2012, dictates that both sides are obligated to assist each other militarily in the event that either one of the sides is attacked or threatened by a third state or group of states (http://www.mediaforum.az/articles.php?lang=az&page=02&article_id=20101215054430699)
Despite the global economic crisis, and amid an eastward shift in the global center of gravity, Turkey and Azerbaijan are continuing their steady growth and are intensifying their mutual relations. Increasingly, Baku and Ankara share an overlapping vision for their region and beyond. And as the recent Azerbaijani-Turkish High level Strategic Cooperation Council has illustrated, the two countries are deepening their commitment to cement their existing strategic partnership with concrete actions.
--Cavid Veliyev
*…while Russia looks set to compete with the EU over Georgia
*Dagestani president subdivides republic into four new administrative areas
*Azerbaijan and Turkey build on their strategic relationship
**New on the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog):
--Russia’s Cossacks Increasingly Diverse, Numerous and Important By Paul Goble
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Putin’s Ukrainian Triumph Is a Major Setback for Russia
The Ukrainian government’s shocking decision to put on hold the process of finalizing the Association Agreement with the European Union, announced last Thursday (November 21), a week prior the momentous Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, could be interpreted as Russia’s success in sabotaging Kyiv’s “European choice” (see EDM, November 22). President Vladimir Putin expressed his resolute disapproval of the long-prepared EU-Ukraine agreement two months ago at the pompous meeting of the Valdai Club. And he now prepares to savor the triumph of his ill will, while accusing the EU of attempting to “blackmail” Ukraine to cancel the cancellation (http://ria.ru/world/20131122/979024045.html). The absurdity of this accusation is underscored by the fact that he personally orchestrated the most blatant bullying of Ukraine’s leadership and made President Viktor Yanukovych a proverbial offer that could not be refused at the “secret” meeting staged on November 9, at the Novo-Ogarevo presidential residence outside Moscow (http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/11/22/fail/). In reality, however, this forced turn in Ukraine’s maneuvering between the EU and Russia could signify a major setback for Russia’s own needs to re-energize the country’s modernization.
It is the economy that is commonly assumed to be the central subject in tri-lateral controversies, and indeed, Russia’s not-so-gentle squeeze on Ukraine’s exports has seriously aggravated the latter’s economic troubles. Kyiv cannot realistically expect that an agreement with the EU would compensate for the sanctions that Moscow has threatened to apply, but neither can it cope with the demands from the International Monetary Fund to eliminate subsidies and cut the budget deficit (http://polit.ru/article/2013/11/22/al221113/). Yanukovich may, on the other hand, count on tangible economic “gifts” from Russia—first of all a discount on the natural gas price, which determines Ukraine’s trade deficit (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 18). Putin, however, is not known for a generous disposition, particularly at the expense of Gazprom, which still has a market capitalization some 60 percent lower than in mid-2008; he is deeply worried about the stagnation of Russia’s economy that pulls the federal budget into the “red zone” (Kommersant, Novye izvestiya, November 21). Consequently, instead of a respite from its downward economic spiral, Ukraine might experience a painful crisis spasm if it links its economy too closely to Russia’s (http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/mir/247736-vo-chto-oboidetsya-ukraine-otkaz-ot-assotsiatsii-s-evrosoyuzom).
For the Ukrainians, it will be clear where to allocate the blame; and Putin, who is seriously unpopular now, is set to become the mastermind of a disaster (http://grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.221433.html). Yanukovych may weather the storm of instant protests, but the deepening domestic discontent, which has already taken the catchy name “Euro-Maidan,” is likely to destroy his plans for re-election in 2015 (Novaya Gazeta, November 22). It is in these political calculations and manipulations that the real reason for Ukraine’s failure to connect with the EU is hidden. Brussels has not promised Kyiv much in short-term economic benefits but, rather, demanded of Ukraine greater transparency in financial flows, harsher measures against corruption, and firmer commitments to democratic reforms. These demands are rather discomforting for Yanukovych and the oligarchic clans that are backing him, but for Putin they constitute a direct security challenge. Therefore, the proposal to hold joint EU-Ukraine-Russia talks for optimizing the partnership is merely a hoax (Kommersant, November 23).
The fact of the matter is that Russia, under Putin’s newest term as president, has resolutely moved from a partnership (awkward as it was) to outright hostility in relations with the EU, driven not so much by economic or gas-political tensions as by conflict between European values and the authoritarian code according to which Russia is ruled. Ukraine is caught in this conflict and, as former prime minister of Ukraine Yulia Timoshenko has warned Yanukovych from her prison cell, breaking the deal with the EU will force the Ukrainian head of state to now follow the Russian “road map” (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1203414-echo/). The Ukrainians know how to rid themselves of such leadership, but a deeper problem is that Russia’s attempt to establish its own “civilizational model” and geopolitical “center of gravity” is effectively self-defeating (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/nikolaev/s62993/5760693.shtml). A Ukraine associated with the EU could have been a useful connection to the troubled but pivotal realm of economic activity and political modernization; a Ukraine associated with the dysfunctional Custom Union becomes a crushing burden for Russia.
Putin probably understands that the Vilnius “victory” over the unfriendly EU reduces Russia’s partnership with Europe to mere co-existence. So he has tried to execute his own eastward “pivot” by travelling to Vietnam and South Korea and by exploiting to the maximum his accidental achievement in securing Syria’s chemical disarmament (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/lukyanov/5762601.shtml). He particularly wanted to elevate relations with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but their personal chemistry did not prevent the bitter disagreements over Syria to prevail in the annual meeting of the bilateral Russia-Turkey Cooperation Council (Kommersant, November 23). Putin was also unable to give a meaningful answer to Erdogan’s direct request to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where China has the decisive voice (http://ria.ru/world/20131122/979030661.html). The breakthrough in the long-deadlocked negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program was achieved essentially by the United States’ efforts through back-channels, which not only devalues Putin’s success in letting the Syrian civil war rage without interference but also boosts the prospect that renewed flows of Iranian oil might push down the price on the global market (http://newsru.com/world/24nov2013/agreed.html).
In a peculiar way, every victory that Moscow manages to score on the international arena exposes the underlying weakness of its ambition to be accepted to the ranks of “sovereign” players who allegedly decide the fate of the multi-polar world. Guarding anxiously this all-important “sovereignty,” Russia finds itself in a far-from-splendid isolation as neighbors grow wary of its egocentric behavior; even allied Belarus resorts to blackmail to obtain new gratuities from Russia.
This isolation seriously deforms the growth of Russian civil society. Putin’s security services personnel (siloviki), obsessed with exterminating the alleged security threat posed by foreign-sponsored non-governmental organizations (NGO), try to make an object lesson in deterrence-by-punishment by prosecuting the Greenpeace activists, who dared to protest against Gazprom’s drilling in the Arctic. The outrage in the international eco-milieu is so strong that Russian authorities had to backtrack and release 29 out of the “Arctic 30” on bail, while facing the verdict of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to release the captured Arctic Sunrise Greenpeace vessel (http://lenta.ru/news/2013/11/23/refuse/).
Putin’s iron grip on Yanukovych’s policy choices is certain to mobilize millions of Ukrainians who see no alternative to the European choice, but Russia will discover that its own hard climb to Europe from the quagmire of Putinism has just become yet another degree steeper.
--Pavel K. Baev
Georgia Between Russia and the European Union: Toward the Vilnius Summit and Beyond
(Part One)
Georgia’s Western orientation is the legacy of former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s government (2003–2012), which ended the predecessor governments’ equivocations. A tradition-bound society with almost no historical experience of Europe, very limited comprehension of European norms and values, and isolated during the past two centuries within the Russian and Soviet empires, was now being told by a young Westernized elite group in power that the country’s place is in Europe. For almost a decade, that incessant message, along with the government’s reforms and the magnetic attraction of Europe itself, generated overwhelming popular support for Georgia’s Western course, and opened the way toward an association agreement with the European Union.
The Georgian Dream government of Bidzina Ivanishvili (prime minister, November 2012–November 2013, succeeded by Irakli Gharibashvili—see EDM, November 4) inherited both the pro-Western national consensus and the reforms that qualified Georgia for association with the EU. The Georgian Dream government has adopted that heritage. It will initial the association agreement with the EU at the November 28–29 summit in Vilnius under the EU’s Lithuanian presidency, and expects the agreement to be signed and enter into force during 2014.
On the other hand, the Georgian Dream government came to power on a pledge to improve relations with a hostile Russia (see EDM, March 14, 2012). The two declared goals—advancing Georgia’s Western orientation while reducing tensions with Russia—are mutually contradictory. In the run-up to the Vilnius summit, the Georgian government clearly prioritizes the Western track over the Russian one.
Russia’s current policy objectives toward Georgia include:
•Precluding Georgia’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or any significant steps (e.g., a membership action plan) that would lead toward NATO accession. Perpetuating Georgia’s military vulnerability vis-à-vis Russian forces deployed in the occupied territories;
•Inducing Georgia to shift toward a “balanced,” two-vector policy;
•Shaping Georgian public opinion toward rebuilding economic and cultural ties with Russia based on the “common past”;
•Discouraging investments that would further develop oil and gas pipelines through the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey corridor to Europe, particularly gas from Central Asia;
•Delaying the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad project; promoting, instead, restoration of the railroad from Russia via Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia to Armenia; using this railroad as a transportation corridor in the event that Armenia completes its accession to the Russia-led Customs Union (see EDM, January 31, October 17);
•Laying the ground for Russian-Georgian joint business ventures in Georgia, so as to develop local interest groups vested in closer ties with Russia (see EDM, February 6);
•Restoring some form of diplomatic relations with Georgia even as Russia continues to occupy, “recognize,” and maintain diplomatic missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see EDM, November 13, 2012);
•Devaluing Western verbal support for Georgia’s territorial integrity by perpetuating the Russian occupation, brazenly disregarding the West’s position. Waiting for Western fatigue to take hold on this issue, and inducing Georgia in due course to explore some “solution” with Russia. Ultimately, holding out the possibility of trading off Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation for a Russian-approved pseudo-solution to the territories’ status.
In pursuit of those goals, Russia holds or is fashioning a range of economic and political instruments to exert leverage on Georgia:
•Visa and migrant labor policy: Given Georgia’s heavy reliance on labor remittances from Russia, the Russian government seeks political concessions in return for restoring visa-free travel of Georgian citizens to Russia. Thus, Moscow claims that visa-free travel is impossible as long as bilateral diplomatic relations are not restored and the embassies are not reopened. The intent is to pressure Tbilisi to abandon its own position of keeping diplomatic relations from being restored as long as Russia maintains “embassy”-level relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.
Indeed, Moscow may eventually ask Georgia to accede to certain Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreements (i.e., return to the CIS), as a condition to restoring visa-free travel for Georgian citizens to Russia and unimpeded access to the Russian market for Georgian products. Meanwhile, Russia’s citizens enjoy visa-free travel to Georgia, unilaterally granted by the allegedly “anti-Russian” United National Movement (UNM) government. Russia’s top negotiator with Georgia, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Grigory Karasin, made clear that Russia would move slowly on these issues when he met with his Georgian counterpart, Zurab Abashidze, for the fifth time since the launch of this format almost one year ago (Interfax, Civil Georgia, November 21).
•Market access: Following Georgia’s regime change, Russia lifted the politically motivated bans it had earlier imposed on Georgian grapes and other fruit, wines, and mineral water. Last month, Russia enlarged the list of fruit and vegetable produce allowed to enter the Russian market (Civil Georgia, October 11).
These steps are undoubtedly welcome to many Georgian producers, and politically helpful to the Georgian Dream government. In the longer term, however, reverting to dependence on the Russian market would slow down Georgian efforts to upgrade product quality to European Union standards (a lesson successfully learned by the Baltic States more than ten years ago). Moreover, access to the Russian market is unreliable due to Moscow’s political manipulation of this issue (see EDM, October 10, 11). If Russian companies establish joint ventures in Georgia to “ensure” the access of local produce to the Russian market, and Georgia becomes more reliant on Russian investments, then it might be a question of time until Russia begins applying pressures or inducements to Georgia to join the Russia-led Customs Union.
•Political influence: Moscow will probably encourage the growth of a pro-Russia political party, which will phrase its message as advocating a “balanced policy” for Georgia. The Kremlin openly promoted former parliament chairwoman Nino Burjanadze’s group for that role during the final years of the Saakashvili administration (see EDM, November 22). Burjanadze took third place in the October 2013 presidential election with 10 percent of the votes cast, behind Georgian Dream winner Giorgi Margvelashvili’s 62 percent and UNM’s Davit Bakradze’s 22 percent. Moscow will almost certainly seek to broaden the range of its political connections in Georgia beyond Burjanadze. It will probably also seek out business partners for Russian companies in Georgia, let such local partners grow rich and expect them to influence the country’s politics. Although Georgia will be initialing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in Vilnius, prospective international investments in Georgia at the moment are largely of non-EU origin (www.fund.ge, accessed November 24).
As in other ex-Soviet countries with multi-party competitive politics (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova), Russia will probably try to maneuver some Georgian politicians into demonstrating that they can manage relations with Russia more beneficially for Georgia than their local rivals could. Moscow will undoubtedly persist with courting the Georgian Orthodox Church, so as to cement a common front against Western influence on society. Influential elements in the Georgian Church share this perspective. Nevertheless, the Georgian Church will continue objecting to the Russian occupation of territories that it regards as Georgia’s.
--Vladimir Socor
Dagestan’s President Proposes Another Level of Bureaucracy for the Republic
On November 21, Dagestan’s President Ramazan Abdulatipov made a surprising statement about possible administrative changes in the republic. Speaking at a government meeting in Makhachkala, Abdulatipov said that Dagestan would be subdivided into four areas, each with its own plenipotentiary representative reporting to the head of the republic. The four area representatives would answer to the head of Dagestan and, together with republic’s prime minister and speaker of the republican parliament, inform him about the situation in the republic on a weekly basis. In an interview with the Gazeta.ru website, the Dagestani president’s press-secretary, Magomedbek Akhmedov, said that Abdulatipov believes “there is not enough feedback,” inasmuch as “the information he is receiving is not sufficient. He needs his own representatives and in order to avoid opening representatives’ offices in each raion, the raions will be grouped into districts” (http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/11/21_a_5763977.shtml).
Dagestan is currently divided into 42 raions and 10 cities—52 administrative entities in all. The smallest of the raions, the Bezhtinsky territory, has a population of a little more than 7,000 residents. The largest among the raions, Khasavyurt raion, has a population of over 140,000. The capital of the republic, Makhachkala, is home to over 570,000 people or about 20 percent of the total republican population (Russian State Statistical Service, Gks.ru). The proposed administrative changes fit into the logic of the Russian authorities and their representatives in the North Caucasus. Since meaningful political reforms are practically taboo, administrative changes are advanced instead, with the aim of increasing the level of the government control over the population. The top-down approach, however, has its natural limitations and is rarely sufficient to reap the hoped-for results.
Dagestani expert Enver Kisriev told Gazeta.ru: “The president [of Dagestan] apparently thinks that if instead of forty subjects only four report to him, it will be easier for him to understand the situation, but this is an extremely dangerous assumption. The republic has clear ethnographic and geographic sub-regions. So setting up such structures will promote political rivalries between those sub-regions. Another chain-of-command, and another source of conflict between the head of republic and heads of raions, will be created. This is an additional factor for instability.” Abdulatipov’s press-secretary said the division of Dagestan may follow the pattern of the lines between the republic’s electoral districts, dividing the republic into Northern, Central, Southern and Mountainous districts (http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/11/21_a_5763977.shtml).
Experts warn that ethnic differences in Dagestan could explode if the republic is divided into sub-regions. Dagestan is the most ethnically heterogeneous republic in the North Caucasus. The largest ethnic group, the Avars, comprise only 29 percent of the total republican population. Ethnic Dargins come in second, with 17 percent. The Turkic-speaking Kumyks come in third, with 15 percent. Ethnic Lezgins come in fourth, with 13 percent, and so on (2010 Russian census results, Gks.ru). The smaller ethnic groups, such as the Laks, Nogais, Lezgins and others, have repeatedly raised the issue of seceding from Dagestan and creating separate home republics for their ethnicities. Lezgins, for example, are concentrated in southern Dagestan, while Nogais are concentrated in northern Dagestan. Dividing Dagestan into four sub regions could reignite the old separatist trends in the republic.
It is still unclear whether Moscow was behind this initiative or if Abdulatipov decided to create the new administrative structure on his own. In any case, Dagestan will not be subdivided unless Moscow approves of the move. If Moscow is orchestrating the division of Dagestan behind the scenes, it means that the Russian government essentially has abandoned hope of controlling the situation in the republic in its current form. Dividing Dagestan would supposedly pit the neighboring sub-regions against each other and make Moscow better off in terms of controlling them—in other words, by establishing a new version of divide and rule. The desperation of the Russian government and willingness to make use of extreme measures is reflected in the intense number of rumors, which have been spreading throughout Dagestan. According to one rumor, the Russian army plans to launch a large-scale military operation in Dagestan soon after the Winter Olympics are held in Sochi in February 2014. Moscow’s envoy to the North Caucasus, Alexander Khloponin, rejected this rumor at a meeting with Dagestani journalists (http://www.riadagestan.ru/news/politics/budet_li_masshtabnaya_voyskovaya_operatsiya_v_dagestane_posle_olimpiyskikh_igr_v_sochi/).
Perhaps, one of the most vexing aspects of Dagestan in the eyes of Moscow is that the perpetrators of attacks in Russia proper still come from the republic. In October, another female suicide bomber from Dagestan carried out an attack in the Russian city of Volgograd, killing eight people, including the attacker herself. Attacks inside Dagestan do not receive nearly as much attention in the Russian media and have become routine. On November 20, two men, 26-year-old Magomed Akhmednabiev and 24-year-old Islam Akhmedov, along with their wives, were killed by security forces in the village of Novosasitli in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district. One of the females was identified as 26-year-old Suzanna Magomedova (http://ria.ru/incidents/20131121/978756663.html). A counter-terrorist operation regime was introduced in two different areas of Dagestan on November 21, including part of the republican capital Makhachkala and the Shamil raion in the republic’s mountains (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/233854/). That day, a suspected militant was killed in Shamil raion while another suspect was killed in Tabasaran raion the following day (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/233944/).
Whether the republican’s government’s tentative decision to create sub-regions in Dagestan stems from the republic’s president or directly from Moscow, the planned move shows that the government is dissatisfied with the situation in the republic. Administrative reform in Dagestan may, however, become a trigger not only for unpredictable changes in the republic, but also may create greater demand for administrative changes, specifically border shifts, elsewhere in the North Caucasus.
--Valery Dzutsev
Implications of Ilham Aliyev’s Visit to Turkey
Following his re-election on October 9, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s first official foreign visit was to Turkey. During the November 12–13 visit, Aliyev met with Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the chairman of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Cemil Cicek. President Gul awarded his Azerbaijani counterpart the State Medal of Honor, and Aliyev reciprocated by also awarding the State Medal of Honor to the Turkish head of state. In addition to visiting the Turkish Aerospace Industries, Presidents Gul and Aliyev held the third meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, during which time, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed seven agreements (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-ile-azerbaycan-cumhuriyeti-arasinda-13-kasim-2013-tarihinde-duzenlenen-yuksek-duzeyli-stratejik-isbirligi-ko.tr.mfa).
During a state dinner with Gul, Aliyev emphasized Turkey’s emergence as a world power by proclaiming, “A strong Turkey means a strong Azerbaijan.” He argued that that the 21st century will be the century of the Turkic world and asserted that Azerbaijan and Turkey are leading the way in this direction (tccb.gov.tr, November 12). The expression that the 21st century will be a Turkic century was first uttered by the former president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, in the early 1990s in his foreign policy overtures toward Azerbaijan and Central Asia. So what does it mean for the leader of Azerbaijan to use this slogan, especially considering that Baku has generally tried to maintain a balance in its foreign policy?
Aliyev’s visit to Turkey occurred against the background of both Azerbaijan and Turkey questioning their relations with the West. In particular, Prime Minister Erdogan has openly suggested that Turkey should join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Russia-led Customs Union (see EDM, July 25, November 8) instead of the EU, and also selected a Chinese company in a tender for air-defense equipment over a Western partner (see EDM, October 25). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s relations with the West faltered in September 2013, in relation to Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan’s announcement that Yerevan was ready to join the Russia-led Custom Union rather than pursue the Association Agreement with the European Union. Baku believed that Sargsyan’s announcement in favor of the Customs Union over closer ties with Europe would compel Brussels to apply sanctions against Armenia. But the lack of a forceful response from the EU looked to Baku like a European double standard toward Armenia and Azerbaijan—a double standard that Baku also sees being applied by the EU toward the unresolved issue of Karabakh (http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/haberler/246207--yukari-karabagda-cifte-standart-uygulaniyor)
Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States have also experienced increased tension recently. The October 9 presidential elections in Azerbaijan were criticized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) for failing to reach international standards. And the US State Department’s uncritical acceptance of the ODIHR report (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215283.htm) has soured relations between Washington and Baku. The critical statements by ODIHR and the State Department even inspired a group of Azerbaijani columnists and newspaper editors to write an open letter to President Aliyev asking him not to go to the upcoming EU Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, scheduled for November 28–29. Instead, they suggested the SCO could be a better choice for Azerbaijan (http://www.1news.az/politics/20131018015817874.html).
In contrast to the West’s reaction, Turkish President Gul was one of the first leaders to congratulate President Aliyev on his re-election on October 9. Moreover, Turkish election observers both from the OSCE mission and Turkey’s Parliamentary Assembly submitted positive reports on the Azerbaijani elections, which boosted relations and enhanced bilateral trust between the two countries. Ankara clearly does not want to intervene in the domestic relations of this friendly South Caucasus country. Over the course of Ilham Aliyev’s decade in power, the bilateral relationship has been dominated by strategically important developments including the launching of the Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum natural gas pipeline (BTE, also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline), the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway signed in 2007, and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) project signed in 2012. All these projects support Turkey’s strategic role as a bridge between the West and East. Meanwhile Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR has invested $5 billion in Turkey and plans to invest $15–17 billion by 2017 (http://www.socar.com.tr/en/content/ilham-aliyev-president-republic-azerbaijan).
Parallel to Baku’s tension with the West, Russia has made provocative statements about Azerbaijani migrants to Russia and the volatile situation in Karabakh, which some experts have interpreted as pressure on Azerbaijan to join the Custom Union. According to the director of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan, Farhad Mammadov, annually Azerbaijani labor migrants in Russia transfer $1.5 billion in remittances to Azerbaijan. But he notes that these guest workers’ contributions to the Russian economy are arguably even higher, so if they were forced to all return home, it would negatively affect not just Azerbaijan, but the Russian economy as well (http://www.1news.az/politics/20131029030651823.html).
Russia’s second source of pressure on Azerbaijan has consisted of veiled threats about the breakaway Azerbaijani territory of Karabakh. After Armenian writer Zori Balayan wrote a letter to the Russian government asking Moscow to unite Karabakh with Russia, Russian Duma deputy Roman Hudyakov echoed the possibility of such a scenario. Then, Andrey Ruzinsky, the commander of Russia’s troops stationed in Armenia, for the first time openly declared that if Azerbaijan tries to restore its jurisdiction over Karabakh by force, personnel from the Russian military base may join in the armed conflict (http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/11/11/takepart/).
Western countries gave no real response to Russian threats. In contrast, the second article of the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan, signed on August 16, 2012, dictates that both sides are obligated to assist each other militarily in the event that either one of the sides is attacked or threatened by a third state or group of states (http://www.mediaforum.az/articles.php?lang=az&page=02&article_id=20101215054430699)
Despite the global economic crisis, and amid an eastward shift in the global center of gravity, Turkey and Azerbaijan are continuing their steady growth and are intensifying their mutual relations. Increasingly, Baku and Ankara share an overlapping vision for their region and beyond. And as the recent Azerbaijani-Turkish High level Strategic Cooperation Council has illustrated, the two countries are deepening their commitment to cement their existing strategic partnership with concrete actions.
--Cavid Veliyev