Post by dustdevil28 on Aug 21, 2008 5:21:39 GMT -8
..... left and South Vietnam Lost Its War by James H. Willbanks
I just finished this book and thought I would type up a quick review for those that may be interested. Willbanks studies the Vietnam War strategy from the starting point of the first Nixon Administration. He states that the policy of Vietnamization was the correct strategy, but that the policy was implemented far too late in the war and that when it was implemented there was too much emphasis on pushing the size of the ARVN to larger numbers and providing costly material military aid that largely was unusable by the S. Vietnamese and ultimately proved more of a hinderence than a help. It all seemed as part of a rush to provide a reason for America to withdrawl and didn't place enough emphasis on actually leaving behind a capable force. The reason behind this rush was that the American public had turned solidly against the war and this was reflected in Congress. Even during joint US-ARVN operations that proved to be great successes such as the Cambodian Incursion. Of this incursion Willbanks writes
"The Communist base areas and logistics stockpiles were dealt a serious blow. The allies captured and impressive array of supplies and material, including 16 million rounds of various caliber ammunition; 45,283 rockets; 14 million pounds of rice, 2892 individual weapons; 5487 land mines; 62,000 grenades; and 435 vehicles"
The casulties for the Americans and S. Vietnames were also relatively low with the 344 Americans killed and 1592 wounded while ARVN suffered 818 killed and 3,553 wounded compared to 11,349 enemy conbatants killed. Still, even with this great success that no doubt set back communist infiltration and supply efforts that would ultimatley grant Vietnamization more time, the American outcry in public and Congress was vivid and they soon passed a resolution forbidding the use of American ground troops in any further incurtion outside of S. Vietnam. This effect hampered the S. Vietnamese during another incurstion later into Loas and the public reaction can be said to have aided the North Vietnamese in their estimate that they could wait out the Americans ground withdrawl before attacking the South again.
In 1972 the North launched the Easter Offensive to test the South's readiness which proved inadequate in most instances, but in others showed a tremedous amount of valor, particularly at the battle of An Loc. The operation was halted by the ARVN forces and the NVA was dealt a devastating blow by exposing themselves to repeated strikes from US airpower. Nixon upped the anty a little more and removed restrictions from bombing the North and mined Haipong harbor. Such a blow convinced the North to accept peace terms in Paris, although they ultimately did not live up to them.
Willbanks argues that the the greatest detriment that lead to the Souths fall was deficient leadership from the battalion commanders and generals in the ARVN who in most instances choose to evacuate themselves via helocopter and leave their troops to do the fighting, to President Thieu. The forces had many problems, but had corruption in the ranks been addressed and the troops been ably lead the fall of the South may not have happened in in 1975.
As a final note, Willbanks does note the fault of American ethnocentisim in our decision to sholder the bulk of the fight in 1965. Doing so soon caused the S. Vietnamese to rely to heavily on the Americans and took away any incentive for them to address the problems in their own military. Had we continued an advisory role, or when we did become involved had insisted on the ARVN taking the lead than the forces and the whole Vietnamization policy may have had a greater chance of success.
Any thoughts?
He presents this case in a pretty straitforward manner and I doubt that either conservatives or liberals could accuse this man of bias in his writing.
I just finished this book and thought I would type up a quick review for those that may be interested. Willbanks studies the Vietnam War strategy from the starting point of the first Nixon Administration. He states that the policy of Vietnamization was the correct strategy, but that the policy was implemented far too late in the war and that when it was implemented there was too much emphasis on pushing the size of the ARVN to larger numbers and providing costly material military aid that largely was unusable by the S. Vietnamese and ultimately proved more of a hinderence than a help. It all seemed as part of a rush to provide a reason for America to withdrawl and didn't place enough emphasis on actually leaving behind a capable force. The reason behind this rush was that the American public had turned solidly against the war and this was reflected in Congress. Even during joint US-ARVN operations that proved to be great successes such as the Cambodian Incursion. Of this incursion Willbanks writes
"The Communist base areas and logistics stockpiles were dealt a serious blow. The allies captured and impressive array of supplies and material, including 16 million rounds of various caliber ammunition; 45,283 rockets; 14 million pounds of rice, 2892 individual weapons; 5487 land mines; 62,000 grenades; and 435 vehicles"
The casulties for the Americans and S. Vietnames were also relatively low with the 344 Americans killed and 1592 wounded while ARVN suffered 818 killed and 3,553 wounded compared to 11,349 enemy conbatants killed. Still, even with this great success that no doubt set back communist infiltration and supply efforts that would ultimatley grant Vietnamization more time, the American outcry in public and Congress was vivid and they soon passed a resolution forbidding the use of American ground troops in any further incurtion outside of S. Vietnam. This effect hampered the S. Vietnamese during another incurstion later into Loas and the public reaction can be said to have aided the North Vietnamese in their estimate that they could wait out the Americans ground withdrawl before attacking the South again.
In 1972 the North launched the Easter Offensive to test the South's readiness which proved inadequate in most instances, but in others showed a tremedous amount of valor, particularly at the battle of An Loc. The operation was halted by the ARVN forces and the NVA was dealt a devastating blow by exposing themselves to repeated strikes from US airpower. Nixon upped the anty a little more and removed restrictions from bombing the North and mined Haipong harbor. Such a blow convinced the North to accept peace terms in Paris, although they ultimately did not live up to them.
Willbanks argues that the the greatest detriment that lead to the Souths fall was deficient leadership from the battalion commanders and generals in the ARVN who in most instances choose to evacuate themselves via helocopter and leave their troops to do the fighting, to President Thieu. The forces had many problems, but had corruption in the ranks been addressed and the troops been ably lead the fall of the South may not have happened in in 1975.
As a final note, Willbanks does note the fault of American ethnocentisim in our decision to sholder the bulk of the fight in 1965. Doing so soon caused the S. Vietnamese to rely to heavily on the Americans and took away any incentive for them to address the problems in their own military. Had we continued an advisory role, or when we did become involved had insisted on the ARVN taking the lead than the forces and the whole Vietnamization policy may have had a greater chance of success.
Any thoughts?
He presents this case in a pretty straitforward manner and I doubt that either conservatives or liberals could accuse this man of bias in his writing.