Post by dustdevil28 on Oct 23, 2008 15:12:04 GMT -8
I just finished reading “The Strongest Tribe” by Bing West.
The book is an overview of the overall strategy and tactics of the Iraq war from the beginning in 2003 to its current point. West provides solid reasoning on what went wrong during the invasion and how conflicting goals and a vague command structure for civilian and military leadership in Iraq worked against America’s goals and served to put our country behind the curve for the better part of the war.
Most pundits today would cite the war’s initial failing as the decision to invade with too few troops. West argues against this by citing that there were 140,000 Soldiers, plus 100,000 contractors in support roles during the invasion. Adding more troops would not have accomplished much. The failure was to invade while not wholly expecting an insurgency, and when that insurgency hit the failure was in the lack of an effective counterinsurgency strategy. For whatever reason the Coalition Provisional Authority, Bush Administration, and MNF-I all thought that they could defeat the insurgency by establishing massive bases outside of the cities and commuting in large convoys through the cities at different intervals during the day and night. What those in charge neglected to think of at the time was that this would drastically take away from the response time of the troops when an attack occurred in the city to either those patrolling, or to civilians. Also it took the troops out of contact with the regular civilians in the towns. If the only thing a local sees of an occupying force is the occasional drive by in a humve and glimpse of men in cammys than it is much easier for the insurgents to paint the armed forces as occupiers who don’t care about the local population. It also serves to surrender the population to the insurgents as all they have to do is melt away in the population during the patrols and reemerge once the patrol passes.
The strategy should have been to imbed troops among the civilians in order to protect them from the insurgents, and also to serve as a front line area where the population could more easily inform on those among them who were supporting the insurgents, but as the military and Bush administration pursued the wrong strategy the situation on the ground got progressively worse. Finally after the Republican’s were dealt serious losses in the 2006 elections President Bush sought a different strategy. Of the many that were presented to him he decided on a new commander for the forces in Iraq, and on a surge in troops to bring down the violence levels in Baghdad so that the Iraqi government could get on with the business of reconciliation.
From here the book details how the surge troops and General Petreaus’s strategy in Iraq put troops in contact with the local population and how the population in most of the Sunni neighborhoods soon turned against the insurgents. The book details how this trend of reduced violence has continued and how the once Sunni hotbeds for insurgency have now turned into the greatest success stories of the war. As it stands now the surge is over and it has achieved its objective of reducing violence; however the Iraqi government has been slow to move on reconciliation. There is also the question of whether the Shiite lead Iraqi government will provide funds and supplies to Sunni neighborhoods.
A few more notable thing’s from Mr. West’s book. I’m surprised at how much he criticizes Iraqi PM Nori Al-Maliki. Painting him as a secular man who can’t get past his mistrust of the Sunnis and in whom the author places little trust as the future leader of a fully sovereign Iraq. Where I was really surprised was the author’s remarks on the Basra offensive in March of this year. At the time I remember thinking that it was extremely brash of the PM to order Iraqi brigades into Basra and I gave them little chance for success mainly because there was little planning to the offensive. They had no established supply lines and no clear plan to clear and hold neighborhoods in the city. The PM for whatever reason figured that numbers alone would win the day. The offensive ended with a ceasefire that at the time appeared to allow the PM to simply save face and pull out. Immediately following though the press played it up for Maliki and the offensive was described as a bold move to establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Mr. West though, described it right as a rash move in which the PM was lucky to gain a ceasefire.
In closing, I would say that the book is a very enjoyable read for those that want to understand how the war has really been fought from the start and to its current point.
The book is an overview of the overall strategy and tactics of the Iraq war from the beginning in 2003 to its current point. West provides solid reasoning on what went wrong during the invasion and how conflicting goals and a vague command structure for civilian and military leadership in Iraq worked against America’s goals and served to put our country behind the curve for the better part of the war.
Most pundits today would cite the war’s initial failing as the decision to invade with too few troops. West argues against this by citing that there were 140,000 Soldiers, plus 100,000 contractors in support roles during the invasion. Adding more troops would not have accomplished much. The failure was to invade while not wholly expecting an insurgency, and when that insurgency hit the failure was in the lack of an effective counterinsurgency strategy. For whatever reason the Coalition Provisional Authority, Bush Administration, and MNF-I all thought that they could defeat the insurgency by establishing massive bases outside of the cities and commuting in large convoys through the cities at different intervals during the day and night. What those in charge neglected to think of at the time was that this would drastically take away from the response time of the troops when an attack occurred in the city to either those patrolling, or to civilians. Also it took the troops out of contact with the regular civilians in the towns. If the only thing a local sees of an occupying force is the occasional drive by in a humve and glimpse of men in cammys than it is much easier for the insurgents to paint the armed forces as occupiers who don’t care about the local population. It also serves to surrender the population to the insurgents as all they have to do is melt away in the population during the patrols and reemerge once the patrol passes.
The strategy should have been to imbed troops among the civilians in order to protect them from the insurgents, and also to serve as a front line area where the population could more easily inform on those among them who were supporting the insurgents, but as the military and Bush administration pursued the wrong strategy the situation on the ground got progressively worse. Finally after the Republican’s were dealt serious losses in the 2006 elections President Bush sought a different strategy. Of the many that were presented to him he decided on a new commander for the forces in Iraq, and on a surge in troops to bring down the violence levels in Baghdad so that the Iraqi government could get on with the business of reconciliation.
From here the book details how the surge troops and General Petreaus’s strategy in Iraq put troops in contact with the local population and how the population in most of the Sunni neighborhoods soon turned against the insurgents. The book details how this trend of reduced violence has continued and how the once Sunni hotbeds for insurgency have now turned into the greatest success stories of the war. As it stands now the surge is over and it has achieved its objective of reducing violence; however the Iraqi government has been slow to move on reconciliation. There is also the question of whether the Shiite lead Iraqi government will provide funds and supplies to Sunni neighborhoods.
A few more notable thing’s from Mr. West’s book. I’m surprised at how much he criticizes Iraqi PM Nori Al-Maliki. Painting him as a secular man who can’t get past his mistrust of the Sunnis and in whom the author places little trust as the future leader of a fully sovereign Iraq. Where I was really surprised was the author’s remarks on the Basra offensive in March of this year. At the time I remember thinking that it was extremely brash of the PM to order Iraqi brigades into Basra and I gave them little chance for success mainly because there was little planning to the offensive. They had no established supply lines and no clear plan to clear and hold neighborhoods in the city. The PM for whatever reason figured that numbers alone would win the day. The offensive ended with a ceasefire that at the time appeared to allow the PM to simply save face and pull out. Immediately following though the press played it up for Maliki and the offensive was described as a bold move to establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Mr. West though, described it right as a rash move in which the PM was lucky to gain a ceasefire.
In closing, I would say that the book is a very enjoyable read for those that want to understand how the war has really been fought from the start and to its current point.