Post by peterd on May 18, 2012 14:11:30 GMT -8
The second Washington Conference, code named Trident, took place between May 12 and May 25, 1943. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his chief military advisors traveled to Washington to meet with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his planning team to debate strategic issues. The conference was mainly concerned with the issues of future Mediterranean strategy, and the invasion of northwestern Europe, but it did have altogether five main objectives: to get Italy out of the war; taking the weight off Russia; to apply to the greatest possible extent the vast Armies, Air Forces and munitions of the Allies to the enemy; to undertake a full-scale invasion of the continent of Europe from the United Kingdom as soon as possible; to aid China. Perhaps the most significant decision taken by the conference, however, was the target date set for D-Day: May 1, 1944.
This conference opened with much greater optimism than had been seen at Casablanca a mere four months earlier, and with good reason. The Allied transition to the strategic initiative, begun in late 1942, was practically complete, and initial plans for seizing the offensive had been successful.
The Americans were significantly better prepared for detailed argument than in the past, as they were ready to press the importance of long-term versus short-term planning, which, as was commonly known, was not favored by the British. They were also determined to get a firm commitment by the British to a cross-Channel invasion. Roosevelt felt that such an operation would be the most effective method of forcing Germany to flight and thereby relieving German pressure on the USSR. American planners also felt that only a landing in northern France could be conclusive and that no resources should be wasted elsewhere.
The British resented the American insistence in planning so formally so far ahead, as they felt it would deprive the Allies of any strategic flexibility, especially in the Mediterranean. However, His Majesty's Government was also in favor of a full-scale invasion of the continent from the United Kingdom, provided that a plan projecting their rate of success could be made. The British planners were convinced that any efforts to land in northwest France that year, 1943, would end in devastation as the Germans had excellent communication across Western Europe and could concentrate their forces much faster than the Allies could hope to reinforce their position.
Compromises were reached concerning all objectives. Regarding D-Day, the British accepted that maximum resources should be collected in a pre-determined area as early as possible in order to effect an invasion of the Axis stronghold. The British and Americans reached an agreement to mount a cross-Channel operation with a target date of May 1, 1944, on the basis of twenty-nine divisions present in the United Kingdom by that date. They named this cross-Channel mission Operation Roundhammer, soon to be named Operation Overlord. The reason for the year-long delay was the need to build up troop strength, landing craft, and supplies. Another reason for the postponement was that the logistical facilities of the United Kingdom needed to be expanded in order that, after the attack, ports could be built up on the Continent to accommodate follow-up shipments at the rate of three to five divisions per month. They also needed to time to ensure that they had complete command of air and sea of the area.
The landing beaches at Normandy would not see action until June 6, 1944, when D-Day would finally arrive five weeks later than originally planned by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Trident Conference on May 19, 1943.
This conference opened with much greater optimism than had been seen at Casablanca a mere four months earlier, and with good reason. The Allied transition to the strategic initiative, begun in late 1942, was practically complete, and initial plans for seizing the offensive had been successful.
The Americans were significantly better prepared for detailed argument than in the past, as they were ready to press the importance of long-term versus short-term planning, which, as was commonly known, was not favored by the British. They were also determined to get a firm commitment by the British to a cross-Channel invasion. Roosevelt felt that such an operation would be the most effective method of forcing Germany to flight and thereby relieving German pressure on the USSR. American planners also felt that only a landing in northern France could be conclusive and that no resources should be wasted elsewhere.
The British resented the American insistence in planning so formally so far ahead, as they felt it would deprive the Allies of any strategic flexibility, especially in the Mediterranean. However, His Majesty's Government was also in favor of a full-scale invasion of the continent from the United Kingdom, provided that a plan projecting their rate of success could be made. The British planners were convinced that any efforts to land in northwest France that year, 1943, would end in devastation as the Germans had excellent communication across Western Europe and could concentrate their forces much faster than the Allies could hope to reinforce their position.
Compromises were reached concerning all objectives. Regarding D-Day, the British accepted that maximum resources should be collected in a pre-determined area as early as possible in order to effect an invasion of the Axis stronghold. The British and Americans reached an agreement to mount a cross-Channel operation with a target date of May 1, 1944, on the basis of twenty-nine divisions present in the United Kingdom by that date. They named this cross-Channel mission Operation Roundhammer, soon to be named Operation Overlord. The reason for the year-long delay was the need to build up troop strength, landing craft, and supplies. Another reason for the postponement was that the logistical facilities of the United Kingdom needed to be expanded in order that, after the attack, ports could be built up on the Continent to accommodate follow-up shipments at the rate of three to five divisions per month. They also needed to time to ensure that they had complete command of air and sea of the area.
The landing beaches at Normandy would not see action until June 6, 1944, when D-Day would finally arrive five weeks later than originally planned by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Trident Conference on May 19, 1943.