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Post by warrior1972 on Jan 12, 2013 8:37:22 GMT -8
In a speech at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in his honor, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces that the United States will protect its allies through the "deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The policy announcement was further evidence of the Eisenhower administration's decision to rely heavily on the nation's nuclear arsenal as the primary means of defense against communist aggression. Dulles began his speech by examining communist strategy that, he concluded, had as its goal the "bankruptcy" of the United States through overextension of its military power. Both strategically and economically, the secretary explained, it was unwise to "permanently commit U.S. land forces to Asia," to "support permanently other countries," or to "become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to 'practical bankruptcy.'" Instead, he believed a new policy of "getting maximum protection at a bearable cost" should be developed. Although Dulles did not directly refer to nuclear weapons, it was clear that the new policy he was describing would depend upon the "massive retaliatory power" of such weapons to respond to future communist acts of war. www.history.com/this-day-in-history/dulles-announces-policy-of-massive-retaliation |
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Post by 101ABN on Jan 12, 2013 9:24:44 GMT -8
Link broken.
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Post by prospero on Jan 12, 2013 14:23:45 GMT -8
In a speech at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in his honor, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces that the United States will protect its allies through the "deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The policy announcement was further evidence of the Eisenhower administration's decision to rely heavily on the nation's nuclear arsenal as the primary means of defense against communist aggression. Dulles began his speech by examining communist strategy that, he concluded, had as its goal the "bankruptcy" of the United States through overextension of its military power. Both strategically and economically, the secretary explained, it was unwise to "permanently commit U.S. land forces to Asia," to "support permanently other countries," or to "become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to 'practical bankruptcy.'" Instead, he believed a new policy of "getting maximum protection at a bearable cost" should be developed. Although Dulles did not directly refer to nuclear weapons, it was clear that the new policy he was describing would depend upon the "massive retaliatory power" of such weapons to respond to future communist acts of war. www.history.com/this-day-in-histo....ive-retaliation Fixed Link www.history.com/this-day-in-history/dulles-announces-policy-of-massive-retaliationI think that one of the things not even considered at the time was the potential that our so called allies would take advantage of us by reducing their own expenditure with the expectation that we would cover the deficit. We should have taken on that responsibility. |
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Post by warrior1972 on Jan 14, 2013 4:59:38 GMT -8
In a speech at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in his honor, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces that the United States will protect its allies through the "deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The policy announcement was further evidence of the Eisenhower administration's decision to rely heavily on the nation's nuclear arsenal as the primary means of defense against communist aggression. Dulles began his speech by examining communist strategy that, he concluded, had as its goal the "bankruptcy" of the United States through overextension of its military power. Both strategically and economically, the secretary explained, it was unwise to "permanently commit U.S. land forces to Asia," to "support permanently other countries," or to "become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to 'practical bankruptcy.'" Instead, he believed a new policy of "getting maximum protection at a bearable cost" should be developed. Although Dulles did not directly refer to nuclear weapons, it was clear that the new policy he was describing would depend upon the "massive retaliatory power" of such weapons to respond to future communist acts of war. www.history.com/this-day-in-histo....ive-retaliation Fixed Link www.history.com/this-day-in-history/dulles-announces-policy-of-massive-retaliationI think that one of the things not even considered at the time was the potential that our so called allies would take advantage of us by reducing their own expenditure with the expectation that we would cover the deficit. Agreed. WE also seemed to think that we could reduce our defense spending on conventional weapons becuase of our superiority with nuclear weapons. The Soviets maintained an enormous numerical advantage with conventional weapons throughout the Cold War, especially before they developed nuclear weapons, and during the period when we had a numerical advantage with nuclear weapons. When the Soviets became "roughly equivalent" numerically with nuclear weapons in the 1970s they still held numerical advantages in troops, tanks, artillery and tactical aircraft. The danger was that the Soviets could consider a strictly conventional invasion of NATO countries with a strong chance of success nless NATO responded with nuclear weapons, but by the 1970s the Soivets had just as many as we did, nullifying a nuclear response as a deterrent to a conventional attack. |
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Post by warrior1972 on Jan 14, 2013 5:07:07 GMT -8
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Post by prospero on Jan 14, 2013 11:01:32 GMT -8
In a speech at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in his honor, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announces that the United States will protect its allies through the "deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The policy announcement was further evidence of the Eisenhower administration's decision to rely heavily on the nation's nuclear arsenal as the primary means of defense against communist aggression. Dulles began his speech by examining communist strategy that, he concluded, had as its goal the "bankruptcy" of the United States through overextension of its military power. Both strategically and economically, the secretary explained, it was unwise to "permanently commit U.S. land forces to Asia," to "support permanently other countries," or to "become permanently committed to military expenditures so vast that they lead to 'practical bankruptcy.'" Instead, he believed a new policy of "getting maximum protection at a bearable cost" should be developed. Although Dulles did not directly refer to nuclear weapons, it was clear that the new policy he was describing would depend upon the "massive retaliatory power" of such weapons to respond to future communist acts of war. www.history.com/this-day-in-histo....ive-retaliation Fixed Link www.history.com/this-day-in-history/dulles-announces-policy-of-massive-retaliationI think that one of the things not even considered at the time was the potential that our so called allies would take advantage of us by reducing their own expenditure with the expectation that we would cover the deficit. Agreed. WE also seemed to think that we could reduce our defense spending on conventional weapons because of our superiority with nuclear weapons. The Soviets maintained an enormous numerical advantage with conventional weapons throughout the Cold War, especially before they developed nuclear weapons, and during the period when we had a numerical advantage with nuclear weapons. When the Soviets became "roughly equivalent" numerically with nuclear weapons in the 1970s they still held numerical advantages in troops, tanks, artillery and tactical aircraft. The danger was that the Soviets could consider a strictly conventional invasion of NATO countries with a strong chance of success unless NATO responded with nuclear weapons, but by the 1970s the Soviets had just as many as we did, nullifying a nuclear response as a deterrent to a conventional attack. At the time we could reduce our conventional forces and rely on nukes. I remember in the late seventies early eighties, more than one table top exercise that was ended when we used a tac nuke to balance the deficit in conventional forces. At the time it seemed like the games were rigged to force our commanders to make that decision. |
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Post by Sailor on Jan 14, 2013 15:51:52 GMT -8
I remember in the late seventies early eighties, more than one table top exercise that was ended when we used a tac nuke to balance the deficit in conventional forces.
At the time it seemed like the games were rigged to force our commanders to make that decision.
It's a little difficult to avoid "upping the ante" when faced with 3-1 or higher odds.
Soviet ground doctrine in those days called for massive overkill in conventional arms, 6-1 or more when on the offensive. On a good day we (NATO) MIGHT have been able to lower the odds to ONLY 2 or 3-1 through a highly successful air campaign of dropping bridges and closing off choke-points. Allied air would have been facing long odds of its own against fixed and mobile Soviet anti-air assets.
Likely the only real obstacle the Soviets couldn't get around or through would have been the English Channel.
Sound familiar?
While NATO often had better equipment and better trained troops these guys would have (IMO) been overrun by the Red Army and Warsaw Pact long before reinforcements could reach them from the U.S.
"Quantity has a quality all its own." - J Stalin
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